JFC2017 – Page 6 – Warren Throckmorton

The 1787 Constitutional Convention – More Congressional Powers Suggested

August 18, 1787 (Click to read Madison’s notes)

Summary

The delegates continued to discuss the enumeration of powers of Congress and formed a committee to make recommendations about new powers to include.

Influences on the Delegates

Although some founders wanted a very limited national government, Madison and Pinckney wanted an expansion of federal powers. Look at what they wanted Congress to oversee.

In Convention, — Mr. MADISON submitted, in order to be referred to the Committee of Detail, the following powers, as proper to be added to those of the General Legislature:
“To dispose of the unappropriated lands of the United States.
“To institute temporary governments for new States arising therein.
“To regulate affairs with the Indians, as well within as without the limits of the United States.
“To exercise exclusively legislative authority at the seat of the General Government, and over a district around the same not exceeding — square miles; the consent of the Legislature of the State or States, comprising the same, being first obtained.
“To grant charters of corporation in cases where the public good may require them, and the authority of a single State may be incompetent.
“To secure to literary authors their copyrights for a limited time.
“To establish a university.
“To encourage by premiums and provisions the advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries.
“To authorize the Executive to procure, and hold for the use of the United States, landed property for the erection of forts, magazines, and other necessary buildings.”
These propositions were referred to the Committee of Detail which had prepared the Report; and at the same time the following, which were moved by Mr. PINCKNEY, — in both cases unanimously:
“To fix and permanently establish the seat of government of the United States, in which they shall possess the exclusive right of soil and jurisdiction.
“To establish seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts and sciences.
“To grant charters of incorporation.
“To grant patents for useful inventions.
“To secure to authors exclusive rights for a certain time.
“To establish public institutions, rewards, and immunities for the promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades, and manufactures.
“That funds which shall be appropriated for the payment of public creditors, shall not during the time of such appropriation, be diverted or applied to any other purpose, and that the Committee prepare a clause or clauses for restraining the Legislature of the United States from establishing a perpetual revenue.
“To secure the payment of the public debt.
“To secure all creditors under the new Constitution from a violation of the public faith when pledged by the authority of the Legislature.
“To grant letters of marque and reprisal.
“To regulate stages on the post-roads.”

Great Britain was a positive influence for Mason:

Mr. MASON was much attached to the principle, but was afraid such a fetter might be dangerous in time of war. He suggested the necessity of preventing the danger of perpetual revenue, which must of necessity subvert the liberty of any country. If it be objected to on the principle of Mr. RUTLEDGE’S motion, that public credit may require perpetual provisions, that case might be excepted; it being declared that in other cases no taxes should be laid for a longer term than — years. He considered the caution observed in Great Britain on this point, as the palladium of public liberty.

1787 Constitutional Convention Series

To read my series examining the proceedings of the Constitution Convention, click here. In this series, I am writing about any obvious influences on the development of the Constitution which were mentioned by the delegates to the Convention. Specifically, I am testing David Barton’s claim that “every clause” of the Constitution is based on biblical principles. Thus far, I have found nothing supporting the claim. However, stay tuned, the series will run until mid-September.
Constitutional Convention Series (click the link)
To follow on social media, click the following links:
Facebook (blog posts and news)
Facebook (Getting Jefferson Right – history news)
Twitter

The 1787 Constitutional Convention – National Power to Curb Rebellions

August 17, 1787 (Click to read Madison’s notes on the day)

Summary

The delegates debated many details relating to the enumeration of Congressional powers.

Influences on the Delegates

Madison again referred to the example of Great Britain as instructive for the Constitution. The Statute of Anne was the first British law to establish copyright protection.

Mr. MADISON. Felony at common law is vague. It is also defective. One defect is supplied by Statute of Anne, as to running away with vessels, which at common law was a breach of trust only. Besides, no foreign law should be a standard, further than it is expressly adopted. If the laws of the States were to prevail on this subject, the citizens of different States would be subject to different punishments for the same offence at sea. There would be neither uniformity nor stability in the law. The proper remedy for all these difficulties was, to vest the power proposed by the term “define,” in the National Legislature.

Relevant to discussions now about the Civil War and the permission of the national government to intervene in state matters, the delegates seemed divided on the matter even as they voted to include this power in the Constitution.

The clause, “to subdue a rebellion in any State, on the application of its Legislature,” was next considered.
Mr. PINCKNEY moved to strike out, “on the application of its Legislature.”
Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS seconds.
Mr. L. MARTIN opposed it, as giving a dangerous and unnecessary power. The consent of the State ought to precede the introduction of any extraneous force whatever.
Mr. MERCER supported the opposition of Mr. MARTIN.
Mr. ELLSWORTH proposed to add, after “legislature,” “or Executive.”
Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. The Executive may possibly be at the head of the rebellion. The General Government should enforce obedience in all cases where it may be necessary.
Mr. ELLSWORTH. In many cases the General Government ought not to be able to interpose, unless called upon. He was willing to vary his motion, so as to read, “or without it, when the Legislature cannot meet.”
Mr. GERRY was against letting loose the myrmidons of the United States on a State, without its own consent. The States will be the best judges in such cases. More blood would have been spilt in Massachusetts, in the late insurrection, if the general authority had intermeddled.
Mr. LANGDON was for striking out, as moved by Mr. PINCKNEY. The apprehension of the National force will have a salutary effect, in preventing insurrections.
Mr. RANDOLPH. If the National Legislature is to judge whether the State Legislature can or cannot meet, that amendment would make the clause as objectionable as the motion of Mr. PINCKNEY.
Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. We are acting a very strange part. We first form a strong man to protect us, and at the same time wish to tie his hands behind him. The Legislature may surely be trusted with such a power to preserve the public tranquillity.
On the motion to add, “or without it [application] when the Legislature cannot meet,” it was agreed to, —
New Hampshire, Connecticut, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye, — 5; Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland, no, — 3; Pennsylvania, North Carolina, divided.
Mr. MADISON and Mr. DICKINSON moved to insert, as explanatory, after “State,” “against the Government thereof.” There might be a rebellion against the United States. The motion was agreed to, nem. con.

1787 Constitutional Convention Series

The 1787 Constitutional Convention – The Powers of Congress

August 16, 1787 (Click to read Madison’s notes)

Summary

The delegates took up debate on the powers of Congress. They easily agreed that Congress should have power to lay and collect taxes, regulate international and interstate commerce, coin money, regulate foreign coin, fix standards of weights and measures, and to establish post roads and post offices. They voted down a clause allowing Congress to print paper money (“emit bills”).

Influences on the Delegates

The one biblical reference in today’s proceedings was to the book of Revelation. Delaware’s George Read said:

Mr. READ thought the words, if not struck out, would be as alarming as the mark of the Beast in Revelation.

Read made these comments at the end of a debate on the power of Congress to “emit bills on the credit of the United States.” Gouverneur Morris moved to strike that clause followed by strenuous discussion. Bills of credit or paper money had become a problem in some states and was in great disfavor. The delegates voted to remove the clause, 9 in favor, 2 opposed. Read’s comment was followed by New Hampshire’s Langdon who said:

Mr. LANGDON had rather reject the whole plan, than retain the three words, “and emit bills.”

The matter was of great importance to the delegates as indicated by the strong words and lopsided vote. Thus, Read’s comment was rhetorical and not indicative of using the Bible in a policy making manner.
As is obvious, things have surely changed. If paper money was hated, can you imagine their bewilderment and distrust of digital transactions. This discussion of paper money is a reminder that visiting the past through these journals is like visiting another world. They lived in an entirely different environment with difference conditions. What the founders did can’t always or perhaps even frequently be our guide.

1787 Constitutional Convention Series

The 1787 Constitutional Convention – Presidential Veto Debated

August 15, 1787 (Click to read Madison’s notes on the day)

Summary

The delegates debated the way bills would be introduced in the legislature and then moved to affirm the power of the president to veto legislation. Madison struck out after four tries to get a committee of revision for legislation. Instead the veto was established as a way for the executive branch to negative bills.

Influences on the Delegates

Mr. Mercer appealed positively to the example of Great Britain:

Mr. MERCER should hereafter be against returning to a reconsideration of this section. He contended (alluding to Mr. MASON’S observations) that the Senate ought not to have the power of treaties. This power belonged to the Executive department; adding, that treaties would not be final, so as to alter the laws of the land, till ratified by legislative authority. This was the case of treaties in Great Britain; particularly the late treaty of commerce with France.

Dickinson appealed to the example of the “Justiciary of Arragon.” This Spanish reference is explained here, but he was signaling his fear that judges would become makers of law.

Mr. DICKINSON was strongly impressed with the remark of Mr. MERCER, as to the power of the Judges to set aside the law. He thought no such power ought to exist. He was, at the same time, at a loss what expedient to substitute. The Justiciary of Arragon, he observed, became by degrees the law-giver.

Morris got in references to Sparta, Rome, England and Pennsylvania:

The most virtuous citizens will often, as members of a Legislative body, concur in measures which afterwards, in their private capacity, they will be ashamed of. Encroachments of the popular branch of the Government ought to be guarded against. The Ephori at Sparta became in the end absolute. The Report of the Council of Censors in Pennsylvania points out the many invasions of the Legislative department on the Executive, numerous as the latter¹ is, within the short term of seven years; and in a State where a strong party is opposed to the Constitution, and watching every occasion of turning the public resentments against it. If the Executive be overturned by the popular branch, as happened in England, the tyranny of one man will ensue. In Rome, where the aristocracy overturned the throne, the consequence was different. He enlarged on the tendency of the Legislative authority to usurp on the Executive, and wished the section to be postponed, in order to consider of some more effectual check than requiring two thirds only to overrule the negative of the Executive.

Wilson did not want to become like England.

Mr. WILSON, after viewing the subject with all the coolness and attention possible, was most apprehensive of a dissolution of the Government from the Legislature swallowing up all the other powers. He remarked, that the prejudices against the Executive resulted from a misapplication of the adage, that the Parliament was the palladium of liberty. Where the Executive was really formidable, king and tyrant were naturally associated in the minds of people; not legislature and tyranny. But where the Executive was not formidable, the two last were most properly associated. After the destruction of the King in Great Britain, a more pure and unmixed tyranny sprang up in the Parliament, than had been exercised by the monarch. He insisted that we had not guarded against the danger on this side, by a sufficient self-defensive power, either to the Executive or Judiciary Department.

1787 Constitutional Convention Series

The 1787 Constitutional Convention – Avoiding Aristocracies

August 14, 1787 (Click to read Madison’s notes on the day)

Summary

A lot of debate today with little action. The delegates decided that the legislators should be paid from the National Treasury and debated over their fears of creating an aristocracy.

Influences on the Delegates

The delegates worried a lot about creating a system which would be exploited by men wanting power and wealth. Sherman summed up by saying:

The Constitution should lay as few temptations as possible in the way of those in power. Men of abilities will increase as the country grows more populous, and as the means of education are more diffused.

James Wilson was fond of referring to the positives in his own state of Pennsylvania.

Mr. WILSON could not approve of the section as it stood, and could not give up his judgment to any supposed objections that might arise among the people. He considered himself as acting and responsible for the welfare of millions not immediately represented in this House. He had also asked himself the serious question, what he should say to his constituents, in case they should call upon him to tell them why he sacrificed his own judgment in a case where they authorized him to exercise it? Were he to own to them that he sacrificed it in order to flatter their prejudices, he should dread the retort, — did you suppose the people of Pennsylvania had not good sense enough to receive a good government? Under this impression, he should certainly follow his own judgment, which disapproved of the section. He would remark, in addition to the objections urged against it, that as one branch of the Legislature was to be appointed by the Legislatures of the States, the other by the people of the States; as both are to be paid by the States, and to be appointable to state offices; nothing seemed to be wanting to prostrate the National Legislature, but to render its members ineligible to national offices, and by that means take away its power of attracting those talents which were necessary to give weight to the Government, and to render it useful to the people. He was far from thinking the ambition which aspired to offices of dignity and trust an ignoble or culpable one. He was sure it was not politic to regard it in that light, or to withhold from it the prospect of those rewards which might engage it in the career of public service. He observed that the State of Pennsylvania, which had gone as far as any State into the policy of fettering power, had not rendered the members of the Legislature ineligible to offices of government.

The experience of the states was critical in the formation of the Constitution.

Mr. MADISON. If the House of Representatives is to be chosen biennially, and the Senate to be constantly dependent on the Legislatures, which are chosen annually, he could not see any chance for that stability in the General Government, the want of which was a principal evil in the State Governments. His fear was, that the organization of the Government supposing the Senate to be really independent for six years, would not effect our purpose. It was nothing more than a combination of the peculiarities of two of the State Governments, which separately had been found insufficient. The Senate was formed on the model of that of Maryland. The revisionary check, on that of New York. What the effect of a union of these provisions might be, could not be foreseen. The enlargement of the sphere of the Government was indeed a circumstance which he thought would be favorable, as he had on several occasions, undertaken to show. He was, however, for fixing at least two extremes not to be exceeded by the National Legislature in the payment of themselves.