Tag: JFC2017

June 22, 1787 (click link for Madison’s notes)

Summary

Today in Convention was all about the legislature. The delegates affirmed 25 as the minimum age for a representative. On the negative, the delegates defeated a motion to allow the House to set pay for members and a motion to take their pay from the National Treasury.

Influences on the Delegates

On the matter of the minimum age for members, the delegates debated mostly on their own experience. However, Jame Wilson pointed to two young men who made important contributions as a reason not to have a minimum age for service.

Mr. WILSON was against abridging the rights of election in any shape. It was the same thing whether this were done by disqualifying the objects of choice, or the persons choosing. The motion tended to damp the efforts of genius and of laudable ambition. There was no more reason for incapacitating youth than age, where the requisite qualifications were found. Many instances might be mentioned of signal services, rendered in high stations, to the public, before the age of twenty-five. The present Mr. Pitt and Lord Bolingbroke were striking instances.

Notice no one referred to the Bible when  in fact there is Scripture about not laying hands on a novice.
On the matter of holding more than one office, SC’s Pierce Butler looked to Great Britain as a negative model.

Mr. GORHAM moved to strike out the last member of the third Resolution, concerning ineligibility of members of the first branch to office during the term of their membership, and for one year after. He considered it unnecessary and injurious. It was true, abuses had been displayed in Great Britain; but no one could say how far they might have contributed to preserve the due influence of the Government, nor what might have ensued in case the contrary theory had been tried.
Mr. BUTLER opposed it. This precaution against intrigue was necessary. He appealed to the example of Great Britain; where men get into Parliament that they might get offices for themselves or their friends. This was the source of the corruption that ruined their government.

Mason agreed:

Colonel MASON was for shutting the door at all events against corruption. He enlarged on the venality and abuses, in this particular, in Great Britain; and alluded to the multiplicity of foreign embassies by Congress. The disqualification he regarded as a corner-stone in the fabric.

Hamilton agreed with Gorham that holding more than one office was the cause of corruption. He favored striking the ineligibility clause.

Colonel HAMILTON. There are inconveniences on both sides. We must take man as we find him; and if we expect him to serve the public, must interest his passions in doing so. A reliance on pure patriotism had been the source of many of our errors. He thought the remark of Mr. GORHAM a just one. It was impossible to say what would be the effect in Great Britain of such a reform as had been urged. It was known that one of the ablest politicians (Mr. Hume) had pronounced all that influence on the side of the Crown, which went under the name of corruption, an essential part of the weight which maintained the equilibrium of the Constitution.
On Mr. GORHAM’S motion for striking out “ineligibility,” it was lost by an equal division of the votes, — Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 4; Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, no — 4; New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, divided.

For the time being, the delegates deadlocked on the matter.
 

June 21, 1787

Summary

The delegates decided to make the legislature two houses with the first house elected by the people for a two year term.

Influences on the Delegates

Appeal to other nations is implied in this oration by Madison.

Mr. MADISON was of opinion, — in the first place, that there was less danger of encroachment from the General Government than from the State Governments; and in the second place, that the mischiefs from encroachments would be less fatal if made by the former, than if made by the latter.
1. All the examples of other confederacies prove the greater tendency, in such systems, to anarchy than to tyranny; to a disobedience of the members than usurpations of the Federal head. Our own experience had fully illustrated this tendency.

Why did they consider annual elections?

Mr. DICKINSON. The idea of annual elections was borrowed from the ancient usage of England, a country much less extensive than ours. He supposed biennial would be inconvenient. He preferred triennial; and in order to prevent the inconvenience of an entire change of the whole number at the same moment, suggested a rotation, by an annual election of one-third.

Delegate Wilson felt the people preferred annual elections.

Mr. WILSON, being for making the first branch an effectual representation of the people at large, preferred an annual election of it. This frequency was most familiar and pleasing to the people. It would not be more inconvenient to them than triennial elections, as the people in all the States have annual meetings with which the election of the national Representatives might be made to coincide. He did not conceive that it would be necessary for the National Legislature to sit constantly, perhaps not half, perhaps not one-fourth of the year.

Hamilton preferred three years and noted that the British had longer terms:

Colonel HAMILTON urged the necessity of three years. There ought to be neither too much nor too little dependence on the popular sentiments. The checks in the other branches of the Government would be but feeble, and would need every auxiliary principle that could be interwoven. The British House of Commons were elected septennially, yet the democratic spirit of the Constitution had not ceased. Frequency of elections tended to make the people listless to them; and to facilitate the success of little cabals. This evil was complained of in all the States. In Virginia it had been lately found necessary to force the attendance and voting of the people by severe regulations.

Eventually, the delegates decided on a two year term and a two house legislature.

June 20, 1787

Summary

The delegates debated the number of houses for the legislative function. The delegates voted down a motion for a unicameral legislature.

Influences on the Constitution

England formed an easy illustration for James Wilson on the subject of representation.

The point of representation could receive no elucidation from the case of England. The corruption of the boroughs did not proceed from their comparative smallness; but from the actual fewness of the inhabitants, some of them not having more than one or two. A great inequality existed in the counties of England. Yet the like complaint of peculiar corruption in the small ones had not been made. It had been said that Congress represent the State prejudices, — will not any other body whether chosen by the Legislatures or people of the States, also represent their prejudices?

Col. Mason also referred to Britain:

He thought with his colleague (Mr. RANDOLPH,) that there were, besides, certain crises, in which all the ordinary cautions yielded to public necessity. He gave as an example, the eventual treaty with Great Britain, in forming which the Commissioners of the United States had boldly disregarded the improvident shackles of Congress; had given to their country an honorable and happy peace, and, instead of being censured for the transgression of their powers, had raised to themselves a monument more durable than brass. The impracticability of gaining the public concurrence, he thought, was still more groundless.

As an influence, Mason appealed to what “the people” would accept:

Is it to be thought that the people of America, so watchful over their interests, so jealous of their liberties, will give up their all, will surrender both the sword and the purse, to the same body, — and that, too, not chosen immediately by themselves? They never will. They never ought. Will they trust such a body with the regulation of their trade, with the regulation of their taxes, with all the other great powers which are in contemplation? Will they give unbounded confidence to a secret Journal, — to the intrigues, to the factions, which in the nature of things appertain to such an assembly? If any man doubts the existence of these characters of Congress, let him consult their Journals for the years ’78, ’79, and ’80. It will be said that, if the people are averse to parting with power, why is it hoped that they will part with it to a national Legislature? The proper answer is, that in this case they do not part with power: they only transfer it from one set of immediate representatives to another set. Much has been said of the unsettled state of the mind of the people. He believed the mind of the people of America, as elsewhere, was unsettled as to some points, but settled as to others. In two points he was sure it was well settled, — first, in an attachment to republican government; secondly, in an attachment to more than one branch in the Legislature. Their constitutions accord so generally in both these circumstances, that they seem almost to have been preconcerted. This must either have been a miracle, or have resulted from the genius of the people. The only exceptions to the establishment of two branches in the Legislature are the State of Pennsylvania, and Congress; and the latter the only single one not chosen by the people themselves. What has been the consequence? The people have been constantly averse to giving that body further powers.

James Wilson, like Madison and Hamilton, appealed to past and current confederacies as well as the experience of the states.

Mr. WILSON urged the necessity of two branches; observed, that if a proper model was not to be found in other confederacies, it was not to be wondered at. The number of them was small and the duration of some at least short. The Amphictyonic and Achæan were formed in the infancy of political science; and appear, by their history and fate, to have contained radical defects. The Swiss and Belgic confederacies were held together, not by any vital principle of energy, but by the incumbent pressure of formidable neighboring nations. The German owed its continuance to the influence of the House of Austria. He appealed to our own experience for the defects of our confederacy. He had been six years, of the twelve since the commencement of the Revolution, a member of Congress, and had felt all its weaknesses. He appealed to the recollection of others, whether, on many important occasions, the public interest had not been obstructed by the small members of the Union.

1787 Constitutional Convention Series

To read my series examining the proceedings of the Constitution Convention, click here.  In this series, I am writing about any obvious influences on the development of the Constitution which were mentioned by the delegates to the Convention. Specifically, I am testing David Barton’s claim that “every clause” of the Constitution is based on biblical principles. Thus far, I have found nothing supporting the claim. However, stay tuned, the series will run until mid-September.
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June 19, 1787

Summary

After Madison’s critique of the New Jersey plan, the delegates rejected it.

Influences on the Constitution

As was true in past debates, the Bible did not come up once. Instead, in his oration opposing the New Jersey plan, Madison showed his vast knowledge of past and current governments. To follow my past practice, I will excerpt mentions of negative and positive models suggested by the delegates. Madison opined:

If we recur to the examples of other confederacies, we shall find in all of them the same tendency of the parts to encroach on the authority of the whole. He then reviewed the Amphictyonic and Achæan confederacies, among the ancients, and the Helvetic, Germanic, and Belgic, among the moderns; tracing their analogy to the United States in the constitution and extent of their federal authorities; in the tendency of the particular members to usurp on these authorities, and to bring confusion and ruin on the whole.

Then Madison appealed to problems with the states:

He instanced acts of Virginia and Maryland, which gave a preference to their own citizens in cases where the citizens of other States are entitled to equality of privileges by the Articles of Confederation. He considered the emissions of paper-money, and other kindred measures, as also aggressions. The States, relatively to one another, being each of them either debtor or creditor, the creditor States must suffer unjustly from every emission by the debtor States. We have seen retaliating acts on the subject, which threatened danger, not to the harmony only, but the tranquillity of the Union. The plan of Mr. PATTERSON, not giving even a negative on the acts of the States, left them as much at liberty as ever to execute their unrighteous projects against each other.
4. Will it secure the internal tranquillity of the States themselves? The insurrections in Massachusetts admonished all the States of the danger to which they were exposed. Yet the plan of Mr. PATTERSON contained no provisions for supplying the defect of the Confederation on this point. According to the republican theory, indeed, right and power being both vested in the majority, are held to be synonymous. According to fact and experience, a minority may, in an appeal to force, be an overmatch for the majority; — in the first place, if the minority happen to include all such as possess the skill and habits of military life, with such as possess the great pecuniary resources, one-third may conquer the remaining two-thirds; in the second place one third of those who participate in the choice of rulers, may be rendered a majority by the accession of those whose poverty disqualifies them from a suffrage, and who, for obvious reasons, must be more ready to join the standard of sedition than that of established government; and, in the third place, where slavery exists, the republican theory becomes still more fallacious.

Madison then referred again to the confederacies of history:

As lessons which claimed particular attention, he cited the intrigues practised among the Amphictyonic confederates, first by the Kings of Persia, and afterwards, fatally, by Philip of Macedon; among the Achæans, first by Macedon, and afterwards, no less fatally, by Rome; among the Swiss, by Austria, France and the lesser neighbouring powers; among the members of the Germanic body, by France, England, Spain and Russia; and in the Belgic republic, by all the great neighbouring powers. The plan of Mr. PATTERSON, not giving to the general councils any negative on the will of the particular States, left the door open for the like pernicious machinations among ourselves.

Finally, Madison referred to more current European experience:

It had been found impossible for the power of one of the most absolute princes in Europe (the King of France,) directed by the wisdom of one of the most enlightened and patriotic ministers (Mr. Neckar) that any age has produced, to equalize, in some points only, the different usages and regulations of the different provinces.

Speaking in response to Madison’s oration, James Wilson said:

Mr. WILSON observed that, by a national Government, he did not mean one that would swallow up the State Governments, as seemed to be wished by some gentlemen. He was tenacious of the idea of preserving the latter. He thought, contrary to the opinion of Colonel HAMILTON, that they might not only subsist, but subsist on friendly terms with the former. They were absolutely necessary for certain purposes, which the former could not reach. All large governments must be subdivided into lesser jurisdictions. As examples he mentioned Persia, Rome, and particularly the divisions and subdivisions of England by Alfred.

Although a religious man, Wilson did not appeal to the tribes of Israel for his model. Those wanting to stretch for a Christian influence might remind us that Alfred was a Christian king. However, one can’t tell from Madison’s notes what Wilson said about Alfred. Assuming Wilson came to his views due to his religion would be quite a leap.
Hamilton then countered Wilson with his own opinion of state governments – he didn’t care much for them.

Colonel HAMILTON coincided with the proposition as it stood in the Report. He had not been understood yesterday. By an abolition of the States, he meant that no boundary could be drawn between the National and State Legislatures; that the former must therefore have indefinite authority. If it were limited at all, the rivalship of the States would gradually subvert it. Even as corporations, the extent of some of them, as Virginia, Massachusetts, &c., would be formidable. As States, he thought they ought to be abolished. But he admitted the necessity of leaving in them subordinate jurisdictions. The examples of Persia and the Roman Empire, cited by Mr. WILSON, were, he thought, in favor of his doctrine, the great powers delegated to the Satraps and Proconsuls having frequently produced revolts and schemes of independence.

Eventually, the Constitution became the law of the land and ever since the states have lost more and more autonomy. Rather than this being against “the founders” wishes, we need to step back and see which founders wanted a very strong national government and which ones wanted a looser confederation. Reading through Madison’s notes, it has become clear that some delegates used Rome, Greece and the European experience as support for a strong national government and some used the same models as arguments against that strong government. At this point in Convention, no delegate grounded arguments in Christianity or the Bible.
 

June 18, 1787

Summary

Much of the session was taken by oration from Alexander Hamilton.

Influences on the Constitution

Hamilton made a passionate appeal for a strong national government. He said his theory is proved by experience. To what experience did he refer? The Bible? Israel? Hamilton did not refer to any biblical model, but rather other governments through history.

Theory is in this case fully confirmed by experience. The Amphictyonic Council had, it would seem, ample powers for general purposes. It had, in particular, the power of fining and using force against, delinquent members. What was the consequence? Their decrees were mere signals of war. The Phocian war is a striking example of it. Philip at length, taking advantage of their disunion, and insinuating himself into their councils, made himself master of their fortunes. The German confederacy affords another lesson. The authority of Charlemagne seemed to be as great as could be necessary. The great feudal chiefs, however, exercising their local sovereignties, soon felt the spirit, and found the means, of encroachments, which reduced the Imperial authority to a nominal sovereignty. The Diet has succeeded, which, though aided by a Prince at its head, of great authority independently of his imperial attributes, is a striking illustration of the weakness of confederated governments. Other examples instruct us in the same truth. The Swiss Cantons have scarce any union at all, and have been more than once at war with one another. How then are all these evils to be avoided? Only by such a complete sovereignty in the General Government as will turn all the strong principles and passions above-mentioned on its side. Does the scheme of New Jersey produce this effect? Does it afford any substantial remedy whatever? On the contrary, it labors under great defects, and the defect of some of its provisions will destroy the efficacy of others.

Hamilton leaned toward the British government as a model.

In his private opinion, he had no scruple in declaring, supported as he was by the opinion of so many of the wise and good, that the British Government was the best in the world: and that he doubted much whether any thing short of it would do in America. He hoped gentlemen of different opinions would bear with him in this, and begged them to recollect the change of opinion on this subject which had taken place, and was still going on. It was once thought, that the power of Congress was amply sufficient to secure the end of their institution. The error was now seen by every one. The members most tenacious of republicanism, he observed, were as loud as any in declaiming against the vices of democracy. This progress of the public mind led him to anticipate the time, when others as well as himself, would join in the praise bestowed by Mr. NECKAR on the British Constitution, namely, that it is the only government in the world “which unites public strength with individual security.” In every community where industry is encouraged, there will be a division of it into the few and the many. Hence, separate interests will arise. There will be debtors and creditors, &c. Give all power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few, they will oppress the many. Both, therefore, ought to have the power, that each may defend itself against the other. To the want of this check we owe our paper-money, instalment laws, &c. To the proper adjustment of it the British owe the excellence of their constitution. Their House of Lords is a most noble institution. Having nothing to hope for by a change, and a sufficient interest, by means of their property, in being faithful to the national interest, they form a permanent barrier against every pernicious innovation, whether attempted on the part of the Crown or of the Commons. No temporary Senate will have firmness enough to answer the purpose. The Senate of Maryland which seems to be so much appealed to, has not yet been sufficiently tried.

Hamilton favored life time appointments as a means of insuring stability.

Was not this giving up the merits of the question; for can there be a good government without a good Executive? The English model was the only good one on this subject. The hereditary interest of the King was so interwoven with that of the nation, and his personal emolument so great, that he was placed above the danger of being corrupted from abroad; and at the same time was both sufficiently independent and sufficiently controlled, to answer the purpose of the institution at home. One of the weak sides of republics was their being liable to foreign influence and corruption. Men of little character, acquiring great power, become easily the tools of intermeddling neighbors. Sweden was a striking instance. The French and English had each their parties during the late revolution, which was effected by the predominant influence of the former. What is the inference from all these observations? That we ought to go as far, in order to attain stability and permanency, as republican principles will admit. Let one branch of the Legislature hold their places for life, or at least during good behavior. Let the Executive also, be for life.

Finally, he mentioned Rome and Europe as offering beneficial information.

The election of Roman Emperors was made by the army. In Poland the election is made by great rival princes, with independent power, and ample means of raising commotions. In the German Empire, the appointment is made by the Electors and Princes, who have equal motives and means for exciting cabals and parties. Might not such a mode of election be devised among ourselves, as will defend the community against these effects in any dangerous degree?

Looking at the illustrations of past governments, Hamilton concluded that a strong national government was the solution to the problems of the Confederation.
 

1787 Constitutional Convention Series

To read my series examining the proceedings of the Constitution Convention, click here.  In this series, I am writing about any obvious influences on the development of the Constitution which were mentioned by the delegates to the Convention. Specifically, I am testing David Barton’s claim that “every clause” of the Constitution is based on biblical principles. Thus far, I have found nothing supporting the claim. However, stay tuned, the series will run until mid-September.
Constitutional Convention Series (click the link)
To follow on social media, click the following links:
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