Month: July 2017

July 26, 1787 (Click to read Madison’s notes on the day)

Summary

The delegates continued discussion about the president and approved a proposal to allot the executive a 7-year term. In this proposal, the executive would not be eligible for re-election. They also decided to remove land ownership as a qualification for holding office. The delegates reviewed their resolutions and adjourned until August 6, 1787 in order to allow the Committee of Detail to prepare the draft.

Influences on the Delegates

Delegate Mason from VA used England’s parliament as a model by suggesting the qualification enacted during the reign of Queen Anne. Mainly this involved having an estate worth 600 pounds.

Col. MASON mentioned the parliamentary qualifications adopted in the reign of Queen Anne, which he said had met with universal approbation.

Eventually the delegates debated this and determined that too many good men (they had no thought that women would be able to participate) would be disqualified by these rules.
In Madison’s notes, the end of this day’s entry summarized the resolutions up to that point. There was much that looks like the finished product but there were more compromises to come. The Committee of Detail then took the work and prepared to report the Constitution on August 6.
 

1787 Constitutional Convention Series

To read my series examining the proceedings of the Constitution Convention, click here.  In this series, I am writing about any obvious influences on the development of the Constitution which were mentioned by the delegates to the Convention. Specifically, I am testing David Barton’s claim that “every clause” of the Constitution is based on biblical principles. Thus far, I have found nothing supporting the claim. However, stay tuned, the series will run until mid-September.
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July 25, 1787 (Click to read Madison’s notes on the day)

Summary

Since the delegates appointed a Committee of Detail (see yesterday’s post), they planned to take a break beginning July 27. The committee worked through the break and hammered out a draft of the Constitution. In session, the delegates debated, then defeated a proposal to allow the Virginia plan to be printed and given to the delegates during the break. Madison was particularly active today and outlined the previously suggested methods for electing a president.  In this instance, he preferred a vote of the people.

Influences on the Delegates

Using Poland and Germany as illustrations, Madison waxed prophetic about the possibility that foreign powers might try to influence our elections.

Mr. MADISON. There are objections against every mode that has been, or perhaps can be, proposed. The election must be made either by some existing authority under the National or State Constitutions, — or by some special authority derived from the people, — or by the people themselves. The two existing authorities under the National Constitution would be the Legislative and Judiciary. The latter he presumed was out of the question. The former was, in his judgment, liable to insuperable objections. Besides the general influence of that mode on the independence of the Executive, in the first place, the election of the chief magistrate would agitate and divide the Legislature so much, that the public interest would materially suffer by it. Public bodies are always apt to be thrown into contentions, but into more violent ones by such occasions than by any others. In the second place, the candidate would intrigue with the Legislature; would derive his appointment from the predominant faction, and be apt to render his administration subservient to its views. In the third place, the ministers of foreign powers would have, and would make use of, the opportunity to mix their intrigues and influence with the election. Limited as the powers of the Executive are, it will be an object of great moment with the great rival powers of Europe who have American possessions, to have at the head of our government a man attached to their respective politics and interests. No pains, nor perhaps expense, will be spared, to gain from the Legislature an appointment favorable to their wishes. Germany and Poland are witnesses of this danger. In the former, the election of the Head of the Empire, till it became in a manner hereditary, interested all Europe, and was much influenced by foreign interference. In the latter, although the elective magistrate has very little real power, his election has at all times produced the most eager interference of foreign princes, and has in fact at length slid entirely into foreign hands.

Also in support of an election by the people, Gouverneur Morris rose to the rhetorical occasion with three creative devices — two religious and one from Greek mythology.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS was against a rotation in every case. It formed a political school, in which we were always governed by the scholars, and not by the masters. The evils to be guarded against in this case are, — first, the undue influence of the Legislature; secondly, instability of councils; thirdly, misconduct in office. To guard against the first, we run into the second evil. We adopt a rotation which produces instability of councils. To avoid Scylla we fall into Charybdis. A change of men is ever followed by a change of measures. We see this fully exemplified in the vicissitudes among ourselves, particularly in the State of Pennsylvania. The self-sufficiency of a victorious party scorns to tread in the paths of their predecessors. Rehoboam will not imitate Solomon. Secondly, the rotation in office will not prevent intrigue and dependence on the legislature. The man in office will look forward to the period at which he will become re-eligible. The distance of the period, the improbability of such a protraction of his life, will be no obstacle. Such is the nature of man — formed by his benevolent Author, no doubt, for wise ends — that although he knows his existence to be limited to a span, he takes his measures as if he were to live forever.

Because Morris invoked an image of Greek mythology, does this mean he wishes to institute a Constitution founded on mythological principles? Clearly, Morris used the idiom to communicate his meaning. Much in the same way, Morris referred to Rehoboam who became a more difficult taskmaster than Solomon. Although the accuracy of this figure of speech is questionable (Rehoboam’s changes were arguably a continuation of trends initiated by Solomon), his hearers would have understood his meaning. However, they would not be moved to even consider crafting a theocratic monarchy.
Morris’ next reference to his Christian views is a little closer to his politics. He laments the trait in humans to seek power and be shortsighted and then credits God for making human nature to be what it is.

The man in office will look forward to the period at which he will become re-eligible. The distance of the period, the improbability of such a protraction of his life, will be no obstacle. Such is the nature of man — formed by his benevolent Author, no doubt, for wise ends — that although he knows his existence to be limited to a span, he takes his measures as if he were to live forever.

Morris and Madison are notable in their repeated references to the weaknesses and depravity of human nature. It seems likely that their religious training inculcated this view and influenced their support for republican government. Given that Madison likely believed in the doctrine of human depravity, it important to see what he wanted government to do about it. In short, Madison wanted government out of religion and religion out of government. In other words, human nature could not be fixed or accommodated by joining church to state. Rather, those institutions were to be as far apart as possible. Government had to adjust to human nature but not join the church to do so.
 

1787 Constitutional Convention Series

To read my series examining the proceedings of the Constitution Convention, click here.  In this series, I am writing about any obvious influences on the development of the Constitution which were mentioned by the delegates to the Convention. Specifically, I am testing David Barton’s claim that “every clause” of the Constitution is based on biblical principles. Thus far, I have found nothing supporting the claim. However, stay tuned, the series will run until mid-September.
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July 24, 1787 (Click to read Madison’s notes on the day).

Summary

A committee was chosen to compose the decisions made thus far into a document for consideration (Rutledge,  Randolph,  Gorham,  Ellsworth, and  Wilson). The delegates discussed against the method of choosing the chief executive and at this juncture approved appointment by the national legislature.

Influences on the Delegates

North Carolina’s Hugh Williamson advocated reconsidering much of what the delegates had already covered. He also appealed to the differences between the United States and England.

Mr. WILLIAMSON was for going back to the original ground, to elect the Executive for seven years, and render him ineligible a second time. The proposed Electors would certainly not be men of the first, nor even of the second, grade in the States. These would all prefer a seat in the Senate, or the other branch of the Legislature. He did not like the unity in the Executive. He had wished the Executive power to be lodged in three men, taken from three districts, into which the States should be divided. As the Executive is to have a kind of veto on the laws, and there is an essential difference of interests between the Northern and Southern States, particularly in the carrying trade, the power will be dangerous, if the Executive is to be taken from part of the Union, to the part from which he is not taken. The case is different here from what it is in England; where there is a sameness of interests throughout the kingdom. Another objection against a single magistrate is, that he will be an elective king, and will feel the spirit of one. He will spare no pains to keep himself in for life, and will then lay a train for the succession of his children. It was pretty certain, he thought, that we should at some time or other have a king; but he wished no precaution to be omitted that might postpone the event as long as possible. Ineligibility a second time appeared to him to be the best precaution. With this precaution he had no objection to a longer term than seven years. He would go as far as ten or twelve years.

I reproduced this section for two reasons: because Williamson referred to England as a negative example, and because this brief section illustrates the fact that the “framers” were not ideologically on the same page. His view of the executive branch was much different from what actually came to pass. They had many ideas which did not make it in the final product. To say that the Constitution was based or founded on any one source (e.g., David Barton – the Bible), is to ignore the ideological diversity in Convention.
A particularly funny moment came from Rufus King, delegate from Massachusetts. After the delegates voted to allow the national legislature to choose the president, some wanted to revisit the provision that the president could be re-elected. The reasoning was that the executive could be more independent if not looking for re-election from the legislature. Thus, some delegates wanted to limit the president to one longer term. One suggested fifteen years (up from 11), and then King suggested:

Mr. KING twenty years.¹  This is the medium life of princes.

It is not clear if King was serious or if this was meant as a joke to illustrate the dangerous direction of some delegates to approximate a kind of monarch. Even if serious, in context, it made me laugh.
Pennsylvania’s James Wilson offered comments which advocated for long term service from gifted people, even into advanced age. Also unusual in this comment is a somewhat favorable reference to the Pope.

Mr. WILSON. The difficulties and perplexities into which the House is thrown, proceed from the election by the Legislature, which he was sorry had been re-instated. The inconvenience of this mode was such, that he would agree to almost any length of time in order to get rid of the dependence which must result from it. He was persuaded that the longest term would not be equivalent to a proper mode of election, unless indeed it should be during good behaviour. It seemed to be supposed that at a certain advance of life a continuance in office would cease to be agreeable to the officer, as well as desirable to the public. Experience had shown in a variety of instances, that both a capacity and inclination for public service existed in very advanced stages. He mentioned the instance of a Doge of Venice who was elected after he was eighty years of age. The Popes have generally been elected at very advanced periods, and yet in no case had a more steady or a better concerted policy been pursued than in the Court of Rome. If the Executive should come into office at thirty-five years of age, which he presumes may happen, and his continuance should be fixed at fifteen years, at the age of fifty, in the very prime of life, and with all the aid of experience, he must be cast aside like a useless hulk. What an irreparable loss would the British jurisprudence have sustained, had the age of fifty been fixed there as the ultimate limit of capacity or readiness to serve the public. The great luminary Lord Mansfield, held his seat for thirty years after his arrival at that age. Notwithstanding what had been done, he could not but hope that a better mode of election would yet be adopted; and one that would be more agreeable to the general sense of the House. That time might be given for further deliberation, he would move that the present question be postponed till to-morrow.

Gouverneur Morris then spoke against the legislative appointment with reference again to England. He also suggested that Providence wouldn’t rescue the nation from human nature.

 Nothing had been said on the other side, of the intrigues to get him out of office. Some leader of a party will always covet his seat, will perplex his administration, will cabal with the Legislature, till he succeeds in supplanting him. This was the way in which the King of England was got out, he meant the real king, the Minister. This was the way in which Pitt (Lord Chatham) forced himself into place. Fox was for pushing the matter still further. If he had carried his India bill, which he was very near doing, he would have made the Minister the king in form almost, as well as in substance. Our President will be the British Minister, yet we are about to make him appointable by the Legislature. Something has been said of the danger of monarchy. If a good government should not now be formed, if a good organization of the Executive should not be provided, he doubted whether we should not have something worse than a limited monarchy. In order to get rid of the dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, the expedient of making him ineligible a second time had been devised. This was as much as to say, we should give him the benefit of experience, and then deprive ourselves of the use of it. But make him ineligible a second time — and prolong his duration even to fifteen years — will he, by any wonderful interposition of Providence at that period, cease to be a man? No; he will be unwilling to quit his exaltation; the road to his object through the Constitution will be shut; he will be in possession of the sword; a civil war will ensue, and the commander of the victorious army, on whichever side, will be the despot of America. This consideration renders him particularly anxious that the Executive should be properly constituted. The vice here would not, as in some other parts of the system, be curable. It is the most difficult of all, rightly to balance the Executive. Make him too weak — the Legislature will usurp his power. Make him too strong — he will usurp on the Legislature. He preferred a short period, a re-eligibility, but a different mode of election. A long period would prevent an adoption of the plan. It ought to do so. He should himself be afraid to trust it. He was not prepared to decide on Mr. WILSON’S mode of election just hinted by him. He thought it deserved consideration. It would be better that chance should decide than intrigue.

The delegates then assigned a committee to attempt to resolve the differences over the executive. It seems quite clear that the delegates wanted to find a systemic way to eliminate the possibility of a bad president. History and current events have shown us that there are checks on bad presidents but nothing which can prevent them.

The 1787 Constitutional Convention Series

To read my series examining the proceedings of the Constitution Convention, click here.  In this series, I am writing about any obvious influences on the development of the Constitution which were mentioned by the delegates to the Convention. Specifically, I am testing David Barton’s claim that “every clause” of the Constitution is based on biblical principles. Thus far, I have found nothing supporting the claim. However, stay tuned, the series will run until mid-September.
Constitutional Convention Series (click the link)

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July 23, 1787 (Click to read Madison’s notes on the day)

Summary

Today, the New Hampshire delegates,  John Langdon and  Nicolas Gilman arrived in Convention and took their seats. The delegates agreed to requiring an oath by both national and states officials to support the new governing document. They agreed to submit the Constitution to conventions of people of the states for ratification and decided to revisit the way the executive was elected. Influences on the Delegates

Influences on the Delegates

Gorham from Massachusetts tipped his hat to the clergy in his support for ratification by an assembly of the people rather than have ratification come via the elected state legislatures. He said in Convention:

3. In the States, many of the ablest men are excluded from the Legislatures, but may be elected into a convention. Among these may be ranked many of the clergy, who are generally friends to good government. Their services were found to be valuable in the formation and establishment of the Constitution of Massachusetts.

Far from proving a biblical basis for the Constitution, this statement nonetheless indicates a friendliness to participation of religiously devout people in government. Then, the clergy were friends to good government. Now, many of those who purport to be leaders among evangelicals hope to establish Christianity as a quasi-religion of the state.
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania supported the idea of a people’s convention to ratify the Constitution since the people are the ultimate authority.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS considered the inference of Mr. ELLSWORTH from the plea of necessity, as applied to the establishment of a new system, on the consent of the people of a part of the States, in favor of a like establishment, on the consent of a part of the Legislatures, as a non-sequitur. If the Confederation is to be pursued, no alteration can be made without the unanimous consent of the Legislatures. Legislative alterations not conformable to the Federal compact would clearly not be valid. The Judges would consider them as null and void. Whereas, in case of an appeal to the people of the United States, the supreme authority, the Federal compact may be altered by a majority of them, in like manner as the Constitution of a particular State may be altered by a majority of the people of the State. The amendment moved by Mr. ELLSWORTH erroneously supposes, that we are proceeding on the basis of the Confederation. This Convention is unknown to the Confederation.

The consent of the governed is where government derives just powers. Rather than consider the Bible or Christianity as supreme authority, Morris asserted that in a republican government the people via their representatives decide.
As a reminder that the Southern states wanted to bake slavery into their Constitution cake, General Pinckney said near the end of the session on this day:

General PINCKNEY reminded the Convention, that if the Committee should fail to insert some security to the Southern States against an emancipation of slaves, and taxes on exports, he should be bound by duty to his State to vote against their report.

1787 Constitutional Convention Series

To read my series examining the proceedings of the Constitution Convention, click here.  In this series, I am writing about any obvious influences on the development of the Constitution which were mentioned by the delegates to the Convention. Specifically, I am testing David Barton’s claim that “every clause” of the Constitution is based on biblical principles. Thus far, I have found nothing supporting the claim. However, stay tuned, the series will run until mid-September.
Constitutional Convention Series (click the link)
To follow on social media, click the following links:
Facebook (blog posts and news)
Facebook (Getting Jefferson Right – history news)
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