## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
GARLAND D. MURPHY, III, M.D. and ) PHYLLIS MURPHY, Individually and ) on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,
VS.
GOSPEL FOR ASIA, INC., GOSPEL
FOR ASIA-INTERNATIONAL, K.P.
YOHANNAN, GISELA PUNNOSE, DANIEL PUNNOSE, DAVID CARROLL, and PAT EMERICK,

Defendant.

TRANSCRIPT OF CASE MANAGEMENT HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY L. BROOKS May 16, 2017; 1:36 p.m.

FAYETTEVILLE, ARKANSAS

Proceedings recorded in realtime via machine shorthand.

Dana Hayden, CCR, RMR, CRR
Federal Official Court Reporter
35 East Mountain Street
Fayetteville, Arkansas 72701

## APPEARANCES

FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:
Messrs. Woody Bassett and James M. Graves Bassett Law Firm
221 North College Avenue
Fayetteville, Arkansas 72701
(479) 521-9996
(479) 521-9600 Fax
wbassettebassettlawfirm.com
jgraves@bassettlawfirm.com
Messrs. Marc R. Stanley and Martin Woodward Stanley Law Group
6116 North Central Expressway, Suite 1500
Dallas, Texas 75206
(214) 443-4300
(214) 443-0358 Fax
marcstanley@mac.com
mwoodwardestanleylawgroup.com

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
Mr. Steven T. Shults
Shults \& Brown, LLP
200 West Capitol Avenue, Suite 1600
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201-3637
(501) 375-2301
(501) 375-6861 Fax
sshults@shultslaw.com
Messrs. Robert Thompson Mowrey and Paul F. Schuster
Ms. Harriet Ellan Miers and Mr. Matt Davis
Locke Lord LLP
2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 2800
Dallas, Texas 75230
(214) 740-8450
(214) 756-8450 Fax
hmiers@lockelord.com
rmowrey@lockelord.com
pschuster@lockelord.com

THE COURT: The matter of Garland D. Murphy, III and Phyllis Murphy individually and on behalf of others similarly situated versus Gospel for Asia, Inc. and other entities and individuals is the next matter to come before the Court this afternoon. Our docket number in this case is 5:17-CV-5035.

The matter comes before the Court today for purposes of a Rule 16 initial case management conference. Appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs today is James Graves and Woody Bassett, also Marc Stanley and Martin Woodward.

Appearing on behalf of the defendants collectively today is Steve Shults, Harriet Miers, Robert Mowrey, Paul Schuster, and Matt Davis.

In preparing for our hearing today, the Court has reviewed the pleadings that have been filed to date, as well as the parties' joint Rule 26 report. I could tell that a lot of time has gone into the preparation of the joint report. That is very much appreciated.

For my review of these materials, I understand that the plaintiffs were donors to the charitable organization Gospel for Asia. The Court understands Gospel for Asia and some of the related entities is a 501(c)(3) entity. Among other things, it purports to raise money for world missions; in particular in Asia,
and the bulk of that seems to be geared towards or focused on India.

The various individually named defendants the Court understands would be the founder of Gospel for Asia, as well as certain family members that hold positions of responsibility within the defendant organizations, as well as perhaps some other members of the board of Gospel for Asia.

The Court understands that the essence of the allegations here are that certain aspects of the defendants' fundraising activities were, in one respect or another, fraudulent, which is to say that representations that were made to the plaintiffs about what the proceeds would be used for, according to the plaintiffs, are not accurate.

The defendants deny those allegations and contend that all of the monies raised were used consistent with its mission and charitable intentions and purposes.

A little more specifically, the causes of action using these facts that has been alleged would include, as I mentioned, fraud in various forms, including common law fraud, including fraud via the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and including various forms of fraud as the predicate for a civil RICO
cause of action. There are also causes of action for unjust enrichment and maybe others. That's all that I can recite off the top of my head at the moment.

The defendants, as I said, deny that there is a basis for these causes of action. They contend that the complaint fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted, although no such motion has yet been made.

They also raise a number of affirmative defenses, including statute of limitations, standing, and some other defenses.

So what I would like to accomplish today is to give each side an opportunity to state any other facts or defenses that they might feel are pertinent; and by that, I mean pertinent to us agreeing on a discovery plan today.

It is evident that the parties have thought through the best way to litigate the case in terms of how to deal with the purported class allegations. The complaint does seek to, at some point, seek class certification under Rule 23. The parties have somewhat different ideas about the best way to reach the certification phase and basically whether there is a need to bifurcate merits discovery from class discovery. The plaintiffs do not necessarily agree with that.

Overall time frames involved, however, I think
everyone is, generally, within speaking, are within a certain range on the same page.

So let's begin there. I understand that
Mr. Stanley is going to speak on behalf of the
plaintiffs. Mr. Stanley, would you like to add to or correct the Court, if I misspoke about your contentions, and kind of lead that discussion towards why you think that the discovery plan needs to be more in line with what you have proposed in the report?

MR. STANLEY: Sure.
MR. SHULTS: Your Honor, may I raise one matter preliminarily?

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. SHULTS: Thank you. Do I need to stand over there, or may I do it from there?

THE COURT: Well, depends how long you're going to be standing, Mr. Shults.

MR. SHULTS: I won't be long.
THE COURT: You can do it from there.
MR. SHULTS: The case involves potentially some very sensitive and confidential information, and the Court has entered a protective order that the parties agreed on which provides for designating certain information confidential and other information attorneys' eyes only.

It doesn't provide that transcripts of hearings like this will be confidential for a time until the parties have a chance to designate whether any parts should be confidential.

THE COURT: It does or does not?
MR. SHULTS: Does not.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SHULTS: I believe that's correct. And so I was going to ask if any transcript of this hearing is prepared, if it could be maintained as confidential for a period of time to give the parties an opportunity to designate anything confidential that needed to be.

THE COURT: That's fine. I think that that is essentially our standard practice. I think it's like seven days after the transcript has been made available on the docket for either party to raise by motion or by pointing to the agreement as to why it should be sealed or sealed in part; and until such time as that period has expired and/or the Court has resolved the issue, access to that transcript remains locked from nonattorneys of record.

That said -- and I don't know exactly what all we will be getting into at different steps along the way -- but this is a public courtroom. Anyone is free to come in. Likewise, anyone should be free to order a
transcript and read a transcript if they desire to do so, again, absent some compelling reason supported in the law to seal the proceedings or to seal the matters made known in this public proceeding.

MR. SHULTS: Thank your Honor. And that gets to the other issue. I don't know but anything may come of today that is sensitive enough to be attorneys' eyes only. If it does, just so that everyone could anticipate that, we may ask that the Court have a bench conference effectively or something like that to preserve the confidentiality of anything that's particularly sensitive. I don't really anticipate that but just wanted to raise the issue now.

THE COURT: I'm scanning the crowd. I see three nonattorneys here, one of which is a party. The other two I don't know for sure, but I believe they said their last name was Dickinson, and I recognize that name as being associated with another matter that's at the Eighth Circuit.

I can't add two and two. I'm not going to make any firm commitments there, but $I$ surmise that they are plaintiffs in a different case against the same or substantially similar defendants.

So again, I don't know where all we're headed to today, and I can't recall offhand the attorney eyes
only provisions of your protective order, but obviously if you think we're about to run this thing into the ditch, I'll look to you to jump up and let me know. MR. SHULTS: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Stanley, you may proceed.

MR. STANLEY: Would you like me to proceed from here or --

THE COURT: Mr. Stanley, we do these fairly informally. So if you're more comfortable there at the table or sitting down, that's fine. I find that some lawyers can't speak unless they are standing up, in which case you're free to use the podium, and using a microphone I think in this large of a group would be appropriate.

MR. STANLEY: Thank you.
Thank your Honor. I think the Court summarized the case pretty well, and what $I$ thought would be important for today is sort of defining the different approaches of the two sides in discovery and where we're trying to go with the case based on the allegations.

From our case, it's pretty simple. It's what did the defendants promise the plaintiffs. So, for instance, "Will you give me a thousand dollars for a Jesus Well?" "Yes, I'll give you a thousand dollars for
for a Jesus Well." That's the first one.
What did the plaintiffs give and then what did the defendants do with the money? "I give you a thousand dollars; show me it went to a Jesus Well." Not hard to figure out. Either it did or it didn't; either they can show it or they can't.

And then, third, we've alleged a RICO conspiracy and fraud because what we allege happened is that a lot of this money did not even go to the field and a lot of this money went into for-profit enterprises like a hospital, a chain of hospitals, chain of educational facilities, a media empire, a soccer team in Myanmar, a railroad plantation. For a long time, there was $\$ 287$ million on deposit in banks in India; there was $\$ 130$ million in deposit in Hong Kong. And so what's going on there?

We allege a RICO conspiracy. The kingpin is K.P. Yohannan, who is the chairman of Gospel for ASIA, Inc., but he's also the metropolitan of Believers Church, and the metropolitan is sort of like a pope there.

The constitution's very clear -- the constitution of the church -- that the metropolitan, by virtue of his office, is the president and final authority of the church government, including the
managing trustee, the president of all trusts and societies of Believers Church, and the custodians of Believers Church at large.

And it goes on and on to say he has the ultimate authority of everything that goes on with the church.

The properties are in his name, K.P. Yohannan's name, a lot of the businesses and the properties there. It's not just Believers Church. There's also Gospel for Asia-India. There's also Bridge of Hope Trust. There are a whole bunch of folks that we're just finding" Gospe1 for Asia 75 LLC, Gospe1 for Asia 275 LLC, there's Way of Hope LLC. We've got entities all over. It's almost 1 ike the Enron transactions that we're trying to unrave1.

There's -- we've got entities in Germany that formed an alliance with Canada. We've got money allegedly going to Sri Lanka and other places. And so what we're trying to find out is what did the plaintiffs give, what was promised, what did they give and what did defendants do with it. Did it 1 ine someone's pockets; and if that's the case, then we want them to give it back.

Now, you also said, you mentioned that the defendants' contention was that all monies were used as
the donors specified. If that's the case, we lose.
This is an easy case. Just show us that the money that came in to Gospel for Asia -- right now. I mean, they can -- if that's the case, they could show us tomorrow: The money that came in for Gospel for Asia was spent exactly as the donors said -- "we dug this many wells, we bought this many camels, we did whatever else" -- and we lose.

It's not a hard case for that kind of discovery to do it. They should have records of showing, as fiduciaries of the money, what they did with the money.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a few questions about that. First of all, $I$ wasn't entirely clear, or perhaps I just couldn't recall from reading the complaint. There are certain representations that you allege about the 100 percent, what you call a guarantee, that all money will be sent to the field for the purposes that were designated.

At some point along the way -- I thought in 2016 -- you indicated that the language on the website had kind of been parsed a little bit to absorb the concept that maybe it was only a 96 percent guarantee because there could be situations where they had received so much money for one particular goal that they needed to redirect it to some other project; and in that
sense, they weren't necessarily completely totally guaranteeing that the money would be used for the purpose designated, but it would be used for some other good purpose.

Initially I thought that that was something that was changed in the wording on the website after a certain point in time, but then $I$ saw similar language on what you call a receipt, or an annual contribution statement or something like that, that your clients received, and it had similar language in it.

So help me understand the 100 percent guarantee and the circumstances in which there was this carveout about, "Well, what we're really going to do is use our best efforts to make sure that it goes to these things."

MR. STANLEY: So that's one of the things that I believe you'll find were criticized by the ECFA and by the independent charities and everybody else about. The solicitations -- and 100 percent of the solicitations, until this time after the ECFA decertified them, 100 percent of them said, "We promise you we will use it exactly as you designate. The Lord's taking care of us. We don't need help for administrative expenses. We don't take any overhead. It goes straight to the field as promised."

I don't recall what the Court's referring to in

Dr. Murphy's receipt, and maybe there was one for 2016. Do we have that as an exhibit there?

THE COURT: This was 2012, I think.
MR. STANLEY: Yeah, I don't recall that exact language and whether or not that put him on notice is really the point that it wasn't going that way, but the -- I think the jury will conclude that the vast majority of representations -- and I'm talking about 99.999 percent - at the time of solicitation, was that "The money I'm giving goes directly to the charity I promise or the cause that I promised -- I was promised it would go," and that never swayed until after the ECFA undesignated them.

Now, we're still in the early parts of discovery, so I don't have the documents yet from Gospel for Asia that talk about the change that they made or any disclosures they made, but certainly that's an area that we'll have to go through because they have an affirmative defense that we somehow ratified. So that is an area of discovery. We're going to have to find out what were the policies and procedures and when did they make these changes and did they try to sneak these in on tax statements or something else. I'm unaware of that.

THE COURT: All right. I'm looking at your

Exhibit 4.
MR. STANLEY: Exhibit 4?
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. STANLEY: Okay.
THE COURT: "All contributions to Gospe1 for Asia are income tax deductible to the extent allowed by law and are made with the understanding that GFA has complete discretion and control over use of all donated funds."

MR. STANLEY: Yes, sir. In the next sentence: "However, we are committed to apply your gifts according to your preference." We are committed to that.

I mean, I think a reasonable jury would say they agreed to apply that there.

THE COURT: So the 100 percent guarantee has a little bit of an asterisk next to it?

MR. STANLEY: I don't think so. I think that they are required under federal tax laws to have this statement. I'm willing to bet they are, the first part of the statement. I think that they are required to say that once you give money to this charity -- I don't know this for a fact, but I'll bet you that's a tax statement, IRS statement, to comply with that.

But then when you follow with, "However, we are committed to apply your gifts according to your
preferences."
And then this other next statement is a common tax statement that $I$ get on mine: "Other than reflected in the statement, no goods or services, in part or in whole, were provided in exchange for these gifts," and, "The value of noncash donations are not included."

I think this is a common tax statement that's required by the U.S. Government but then they added, on their own, "We are committed to apply your gifts according to your preferences."

THE COURT: All right.
MR. STANLEY: So I don't think that changes anything, to be honest.

THE COURT: All right. The other question I had was there are some allegations in the complaint about the monies that were designated to be sent to the field or that were sent to the field were -- I'm not sure if the proper word's "diverted" but were channeled into these for-profit businesses or institutions that you've identified: The rubber plantation, the for-profit school, what sounds like a for-profit hospital, things of that nature.

Is the -- is there a specific allegation that the profits that were raised by these for-profit entities -- well, let me ask my question this way:

Where did those profits go to? Did they go back into the missions in the field, or did they go somewhere else, or at this point do you know?

MR. STANLEY: No clue. Our forensic people so far tell us money's missing. I believe GFA's position, as we've talked to counsel -- and I don't want to misrepresent what they say -- is that, in fact, it does, they say, eventually will go back into the field, but nobody lined their pockets with this. That's one of the big questions that we need to resolve in this case.

Our -- even no matter what happened, okay -I'm very interested in knowing what happened. I think that's really interesting to me. But if you promise me -- if you ask me for money to be used for this and you use it for something else, then no matter what your intentions are, you didn't use it for the purposes that you said you were going to use it; and when the jury sees the urgent appeals that people need this money right away for a well or for the child or for whatever else, earthquake relief and, in fact, none of it's making it -- for two, two and a half years, I think no money made it to India -- that the money's not being used as specified.

You know, the notion of, "Hey, haven't we done you a favor. If we take your dollar and we invest it in
a for-profit and we make a dollar-fifty out of it; we're doing you a favor; now we're able to use more for this charity," that's not what our people signed up for.

Our people didn't sign up for you to take this money and put it in a for-profit vehicle which, by the way, you might have lost money in. Who knows, right? I don't know if it's for -- I don't know if they are making a profit or not, but we didn't agree to put it into a business enterprise; we agreed to use it for a well or a camel or a motorcycle or whatever, sponsor a child, earthquake relief. Whatever we agreed to, that's what we as good Christians wanted to give the money to, to help for our evangelical mission.

Buying a hospital, buying -- even though it may have done great work -- educating kids, great thing. If the solicitation was "Give us money for our school," I don't have a beef for that. Or give it to a hospital, a for-profit hospital and someone wants to donate money to it, I don't really care. But that's not what this case is about. This case its about specific appeals for specific causes that people gave their money to and it never made it there.

THE COURT: A11 right. Thank you.
MR. STANLEY: And can $I$ raise a few more things?

THE COURT: You may.
MR. STANLEY: Okay. I wanted to understand how the Court prefers to handle discovery sort of disputes. One of the things I think we're going to come up on -and we've already started these discussions a little bit.

By the way, Mr. Mowrey and I -- and Ms. Miers and I've had cases before, years ago. We get along fine. They are great lawyers. We have different approaches on some things.

They are representing Gospel for Asia, Inc. and several other individuals. One of those individuals is K.P. Yohannan, who happens to be the metropolitan of this church and who we allege controls this business empire.

We're getting documents so far from Gospel for Asia, Inc. I think that we're going to run into a problem when we say, "This property that's in your name, K.P. Yohannan" -- the rubber plantation or the hospital, whatever else -- "where did the money come from; show us the books and all that stuff"; I anticipate we're going to have problems there on whether or not that's appropriate or et cetera and so we'll have to come back to the Court for, I'm sure, some conferences, some issues.

I was just going to get an idea from the Court of how we're going to deal with those things.

THE COURT: Well, I think the first thing that we need to resolve today is whether discovery is going to be class only, whether it's going to be bifurcated; and if it's bifurcated, how much overlap is there going to be and then try to define the very fuzzy edges of where the overlap between class and merits begins and ends.

Assuming that we do not bifurcate discovery, and should there be a discovery disagreement, just as a general procedure, you will find in our scheduling order that you're required to first meet and discuss, and that can't just be perfunctory but really try to work through whatever the issue is.

If you've made a very good faith effort to amicably work it out but can't, then notify the Court that you would like a telephone conference with the Court prior to filing any discovery motion.

We will likely ask you to file some sort of letter -- I mean, depending on what it is. If it's super simple, we may not need that; but if we get the sense that it's a little more complicated, we may have you -- the parties submit a joint letter that kind of outlines the issue and the parties' positions in a very
concise fashion.
And then we'11 have a - either we'11 have a hearing, typically by telephone, to take that up; and if it is something that the Court can -- you know, it's straightforward enough that the Court can kind of discern what the issues are and give you guidance on how to resolve that, that's what we'11 do. If it's something that, just out of a matter of necessity, is going to require motion practice, then we will authorize you to file a motion to compel.

Al1 that said, I strongly encourage the attorneys to work together on this. You've got a confidentiality agreement in place. The parties need to be thinking about proportionality and the needs of the case.

That said -- well, discovery's pretty broad. I think the current direction is the Court must look to proportionality. So I think that about nine-tenths of that is common sense. So $I$ don't know how else to kind of preview my thoughts and practices, but I'd rather focus on doing what's productive as opposed to really long discovery motions and briefs in support.

MR. STANLEY: And you hear those yourself; you don't do a magistrate judge?

THE COURT: There has been occasions, I call it
being required to go sit next to the teacher's desk, and I will get Magistrate Judge Wiedemann involved -- and I've had to do this before -- and literally require the attorneys to designate members to what I call executive committee, and the executive committee has to meet on telephone calls or in person on a regular basis and with the Court in person or by phone calls on a regular basis until we can resolve whatever the discovery dispute is.

You don't want to go sit next to the teacher's desk.

MR. STANLEY: I've had a lot of experience with that before becoming a lawyer.

I also admit a bit of a failure on one more thing and that is the notion of bifurcation. I've been doing this 25 years, class actions and, you know, I understand the term "bifurcation," but rarely have I ever seen it be very meaningful because it does bleed over, as the Court knows.

In this case -- and we have to prove numerosity unless they stipulate to that, which is how many class members are there. How many gave donations; that's easy. We have to talk about a little bit of our case, sort of a prima facie, talk about being able to do some discovery to prove the RICO allegations and prove where the money went. Again, if they can prove that -- if
they can show us that the money went exactly as designated, that's great.

I will tell you, by the way, forensically right now we can show 14 percent of the money went as designated, not 98, not 99, but about 14 percent. But if they were at 99 percent and said, you know, "We screwed up on 1 percent," probably not going to waste my time on it and, you know, we've got other stuff we'd like to do too.

But on the bifurcation, most of the stuff that we're going to have to prove for trial, we're going to have to for class cert, and it does bleed over. This is really complex because, you know, I think the rules call for maybe 10 depositions or whatever.

We have, just alone, 12 shell companies that are taking money from Gospel for Asia and sending it to either Hong Kong or -- this was in the United States, all controlled by GFA, and even on their balance sheet now, but they're separate companies, where these wire transfers, money comes in and money goes out, ostensibly so that the Indian government wouldn't understand that it was all coming from Gospel for Asia. So they used different names to do this so that it would be make it more difficult.

We have at least 12 different entities in India
that are receiving the money that are all controlled by K.P. Yohannan in other countries. We have money that's -- it is really, really complex. I have charts just going everywhere. So we have to kind of un- -pull it apart to understand where the money went. And forensically, again, it shouldn't be hard if we got all the bank statements. It's a pretty -- I'm an accountant -- I have a degree in accounting -- it's a pretty easy thing to do is to go through and follow the money, but the question is whether or not we get the recipient side of it.

You know, I've been toying with the notion in my mind. If they say, "We can't tell you where the money went," I almost think we won our case, right? "We took your money and we sent it; we don't know where it went," you know, maybe that is good enough. I don't know. I don't -- I'd rather be able to track it and see where it all went; but if I gave them the money and they said they were going to apply it towards this and they promise 100 percent is there and they said, "We have no control over it and we can't tell you because we gave it to third parties who have no control over it," maybe we win that way. I don't know. But --

THE COURT: Well, to what extent were there -were any of the defendant entities regularly audited?

MR. STANLEY: So that's a great question. The U.S. entity was audited every year -- well, the years in question -- mostly by Bland Garvey and then this firm out of North Carolina we just discovered, and the audits -- we're trying to meet with them now to see whether or not they're a possible target defendant because they improperly did not handle related party transactions as should be required in the audits.

We have a tolling agreement with Bland Garvey right now. The North Carolina firm we haven't talked to yet. Gospel for Asia-Canada had an audit firm; and there was an audit firm in India, but it's questionable whether that was even an audit. I don't know what standards they applied, but they have been resoundingly criticized for the work that they did.

THE COURT: And what sort of information is required on a -- is any detail required on a 501(c)(3) report?

MR. STANLEY: So that's a good question. I can't figure out why they are not filing what's called a 990. Churches don't file 990s, as I understand, but this really isn't a church. I'm trying to figure this out in my own mind. I haven't done discovery on it.

They're a fundraising vehicle for a religious cause, but they're not, in and of themselves, a church.

I don't know if they got --
THE COURT: One aspect is a church, is it not?
MR. STANLEY: I guess Catholic Charities is a church, and I just don't understand whether the IRS would require --

THE COURT: What is Believers Church?
MR. STANLEY: Believers Church is in India, although there is a Believers Church in Texas, right?

MR. WOODWARD: Believers Eastern Church of Wills Point.

MR. STANLEY: There's a Believers Eastern Church of Wills Point. Believers Church is not an American entity. It is an Indian entity; and even though it's controlled by K. P. Yohannan as a metropolitan, they don't have a duty to the Americans. They do have a duty to file FC-4s and FC-6s in India reflecting the receipt and use of foreign donations. I'm not sure what other requirements they have in India, and I'm trying to figure that out on my own also.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. STANLEY: But that's what $I$ want to ask Dr. Yohannan, "What did you do with the money and what kind of books are."

You know, you raise a really good question about something else when you mention the auditors
because ostensibly both the ECFA, which ostensibly conducted audits and gave a Good Housekeeping seal of approval -- and Bland Garvey -- in order to do that, they would have had to have all the books and records handed over to them. Certainly a competent CPA firm, if they are doing an audit, has to test everything. So there might be a way to get some stuff if they don't have it. We haven't let loose on that.

We're planning on -- if ECFA won't cooperate, I guess we have to go to the court in Virginia and get authority to serve discovery.

THE COURT: And you've sued an entity called Gospel for Asia-International. Defendants contend that that is a nonexistent -- currently nonexistent entity. What is your knowledge of this entity?

MR. STANLEY: You know, it's really befuddling to us. We see correspondence and everything that shows it still exists. Mr. Mowrey has represented to us it no longer exists. We don't know whether it was ever formally recognized by any governmental entity. It appears to be a joint venture of sorts between Gospel for Asia-Germany and Canada and some others.

MR. WOODWARD: And U.S.
MR. STANLEY: And U.S., but never formally filed to our notice.

I don't know. It's one of the issues we've got to handle in discovery. They had not appeared by counse1, and $I$ just don't know how to answer that.

THE COURT: Al1 right. Well, I think that the point of where you were going is that you contend that the proceeding should not -- discovery should not be bifurcated because the overlap would be -- the overlap would swallow any efficiencies to be gained by bifurcating?

MR. STANLEY: I truly can't tell the Court much more than $I$ 'm going to be able to prove at trial that $I$ don't need to have a good handle on for class certification at some point. I mean -- well, yeah -I'm sorry, that's not true.

There would be some stuff that we can go ahead and get more discovery on after class certification, that is true. I'm not sure the areas that we need for class certification will differ that dramatically.

May $I$ raise one more point in that regard?
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. STANLEY: I was going to -- I told Mr. Mowrey and counsel that $I$ wanted to call an audible on one thing that we put in the Schedule $F$, $I$ think, on class certification. We picked dates for filing a class cert brief and a response in a reply. I'd like to
suggest that that be the final date to file a motion for class cert.

It doesn't make sense to limit ourselves to wait until December if, for instance, we can file in September or in July. And then I'd like to keep the same time periods 30 days later to file a response, so long as it's not on a holiday -- right, Mr. Mowrey? -and 30 days later to file a reply.

And the same thing with the designation of class experts for cert; if we designate an expert, then rebuttal within 30 days. So in other words, I would like the final time period to file for class cert in December of 2017 -- I'm sorry. January, January 19 of 2018, but leave to file earlier and then set up that time period.

I think those are the main issues. I think we covered pretty well. We really wanted the Court to understand the breadth of this discovery. This is not an easy case -- well, it could be an easy case if we just got the information we needed, but it may not be an easy case to get the information and find out where this money's gone. There have been lots of people trying to track this money for years.

I encourage the Court to read the ECFA letter that's attached as Exhibit A, I think, to our -- Exhibit

1 to our complaint, and they really detail a lot of these issues that we're facing.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
MR. STANLEY: Thank you.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Mowrey, I'11 give you an opportunity to put into context the defendants' collectively position as to these allegations; and if I have misstated something, be sure and point that out to me and then all that kind of geared towards why it is that you contend that this would be a good case for bifurcating discovery phases.

MR. MOWREY: Your Honor, I'11 take you up on sitting, if that's okay with you.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. MOWREY: I'd probably rather stand but I think I will sit, if that's okay with you.

THE COURT: That's fine with me if Mr. Shults will move because $I$ can't see through him.

MR. MOWREY: So, your Honor, obviously
Mr. Stanley covered a lot of ground, and I don't want to go point by point, but $I$ do want to make a couple of points.

You read the complaint, and you're shocked by the complaint, but what the complaint doesn't say is probably the most important fact in this case and that
is that -- and you heard Mr. Stanley say today, two or three times, 1 ine their pockets, that sort of -- that sort of wording. The ECFA, when they came in and did their report, they did not say one thing about money that was missing, stolen, $1 i n i n g$ pockets.

We have produced already --
THE COURT: Well, there was $\$ 20$ million that they said had been misappropriated from -- that's not the right word -- redirected from contributions that were intended to be used on the field that the field then sent to the United States to go towards the down payment on this elaborate church. That's what the --

MR. MOWREY: Well, actually, your Honor, the ECFA, on that point, what they say in their letter --

MR. SCHUSTER: Number 7.
MR. MOWREY: This is Number 7 and Number 8. And there was this allegation that $\$ 20$ miliion had been used for the campus, and what is stated in the letter from the ECFA is that ECFA was informed -- this is the second paragraph of Paragraph 8 -- on August 24 , ECFA was informed that GFA-India made a gift to GFA of what -- let's call it $\$ 20$ mil1ion -- in 2013 to complete GFA's new office.

On August 27, GFA's staff confirmed that the funds relating to the donation were originally received
by GFA's gifts restricted for the field, and GFA transferred to field partners to fulfill donor restrictions.

The documents -- your Honor, this gets a little complicated, but the documents that we have provided to the plaintiffs show that the $\$ 20$ million did not come from any U.S. donors. This was $\$ 20$ million that GFA-India had. It was their money. It was sitting in an account in Canada.

There were Canadian donors who had given this money to GFA-India to be used in various purposes. GFA-India directed that money to be given for the campus and then GFA-India fulfilled requests, the specific requests, from internal money in GFA-India to replenish the Canadian account.

The bottom line here is that -- and I don't know if the Court followed that, but the bottom line here is that none of that $\$ 20$ million came from any U.S. donors.

THE COURT: Well, it says in the second sentence that GFA staff confirmed that the funds relating to this donation were originally received by GFA as gifts restricted for the field.

I had understood that in the nomenclature used in this letter that they were drawing a distinction
between the entity "GFA-India" and the entity "Gospel for Asia, Inc.," and my understanding of how the definition was is that these were contributions to GFA, Inc. that were collected, intended for donations to the field and then transferred back.

MR. MOWREY: What the documents actually show -- and we have a document; there are actually a couple of them --

THE COURT: So the GFA staff was incorrect in their understanding of what the documents show?

MR. MOWREY: I think -- I think it may have been a misinterpretation at the time, your Honor. The documents show -- I mean, again, this money -- on this particular fact, I mean -- or the allegation, the documents show what they show, and they show that the \$20 million came from the Canadian account; and the Canadian account was monies that were for GFA -- they were GFA-India's money but had been originally given by GFA-Canada donors -- or donors in Canada.

THE COURT: The GFA report's nine pages long. Scattered throughout, it sounds like it is drawing assumptions based on information that it has reviewed; but in other places, it specifically says, "We talked to staff, and GFA staff says this; GFA staff says that."

How would you characterize the extent to which

Gospel for Asia disagrees with the findings or conclusions in the ECFA report? Is there any part of it that you agree with; half of it's true, half of it's not; or most of it's substantially true? How would you characterize it?

MR. MOWREY: Your Honor, many of the findings in the report were, in fact, what was happening. The problem here was really an accounting and the standards for the ECFA.

Again, the point here is that they don't say that, well, these funds were taken and spent on boats and planes and properties and all this sort of thing. What they were -- I mean, the very first one here is -and the first couple of points is that there were large monies that were being held, and they thought that to be inappropriate.

What's happened since is that money has been -and there's reasons for that, your Honor; but what's happened since, that money has been spent down and has been distributed.

Going to the heart of their allegations, we believe that we will be able to show that the monies that were designated went to the particular items that were specified. What was happening, your Honor, is that -- just to take one example, you have a -- let's
say a thousand dollars is given to a Jesus Well, and that thousand dollars went to GFA-India, but it may not have gone to GFA-India direct. It may have gone to an account in Hong Kong.

That money -- this was happening in the past. That money was then sat there. GFA-India, from its funds, used a thousand dollars of their monies to fulfill the request that had been made by the -- by the U.S. donor.

So I believe that we will be able to show that, in fact, the monies that were designated went to all the various things that people gave designations for. And if I could skip to a -- I say "skip to." Let me address a point that was discussed a lot here and that's a bifurcation issue.

I agree with Mr. Stanley about the bifurcation sort of what -- in one respect in that is what should be bifurcated and what should not. Our intent here -- and we've already produced approximately 25,000 documents; we intend to produce more certainly in the next nine days, nine or ten days.

Much -- many of those documents go to merits. They clearly go to merits. They don't just deal with class issues. I do think that there are some areas -if the Court were to certify this case, which, I don't
think it will because I think there's too many reasons as to why it shouldn't be certified. But if it were to certify this case, one of the areas that clearly should be bifurcated are other donors. Now, they haven't -they have asked in one place for this in the case management plan. It is mentioned there.

We've given them all the information with respect to the Murphys; but when it comes to individual information with respect to all these other donors, that seems to me to be clearly an issue that should be put off, not -- unless this case is certified.

With respect to most of these other areas, I'm not sure that we have a disagreement. We're going to be ending up producing most of the documents that they want.

Here is the big issue, and it doesn't really have to do with bifurcation, but I think that the Court should give us some guidance on this today. If you look at their case management plan, we could go through. They have four pages, and we're going to produce most all the things that they have asked for, except the problem that we have, Mr. Stanley has mentioned over and over how K. P. Yohannan just controls everything.

There are many -- there are entities in India: The Believers Church, GFA-India. K. P. Yohannan is not
on the board of those entities. Is he the metropolitan? Yes, he is the Metropolitan of Believers Church. Does that mean he has access to all of their records? No, it doesn't.

Now, Mr. Stanley doesn't believe that. Mr. Stanley thinks that whatever K. P. Yohannan wants, he can get; but we have no problem in producing everything we can with respect to the entities that he has sued. But when it comes to wholly separate entities in India, that's where the rub is.

Now, your Honor mentioned, and one of the things that we are prepared to do, they have audits of -- that have been done for GFA-USA for the last -well, for $I$ don't know how long -- when they started, but they have gotten them for a number of years.

In the last couple of years, in order for GFA-USA auditors to complete their audit, they requested that there be GAAP audits done of these Indian entities, and we will produce those.

And what the plaintiffs are going to say -- I mean, you heard Mr. Stanley say, "Well, they can account for 18 percent of these funds." I think he knows that that is incorrect. The FC-6 reports, they only report monies that go into Indian accounts. They do not report monies that go to GFA-India's accounts in other -- in
other locations. And in order for the GFA-USA to complete their reports, they requested that GAAP audits be done for the various entities that monies were given to. And we'll provide those. And we'll provide them -they were given to the U.S. auditors as we understand them and so they -- it seems to me, your Honor, that that should certainly be the first step in satisfying the plaintiffs that these monies went to where they were represented they should go.

What I was going to say at the outset is that what is glaringly missing in this case is properties, residences, planes, boats, yachts. We have provided their tax returns. I can tell you that Mr. K. P. Yohannan, he receives no income from his -- as I understand it, he receives no income from any source in India. When he's over there, he stays at a particular house that's a very modest residence, he eats on the campus with other people, but he receives no -- he receives no income there. And there's -- this is not the kind of situation $I$ think that they would like to portray that we know of -- all of us have seen -- where these TV evangelists and these people come in and they are out living the high life. That just is not going to be the case here.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Stanley has alleged to
the Court that there's all sorts of real estate and other assets that are in Mr. Yohannan's name personally, and what $I$ hear you saying is that's just not so.

MR. MOWREY: That's just not true. There may be, your Honor -- and we haven't actually seen any documents yet with properties in his name. There may be some properties where he is named as a trustee, similarly to -- I don't know how it is here in Fayetteville, but in Dallas, $I$ write a check on my -for my car tax to John Ames, who happens to be the county commissioner. Well, that doesn't go into John Ames' pocket, but that's the name that it goes to.

So there may be some instances where properties are -- where there has to be a name associated, but actually $I$ haven't seen any of those yet, if they are there. But in terms of properties that he personally owns, no, I think the evidence is going to be that that is just simply not the case.

THE COURT: What about these so-called for-profit entities in India? I guess that presumes that they make a profit. But if they were to make a profit, where does that money go?

MR. MOWREY: We11, first of all, your Honor, let's take the rubber plant. The rubber plant, as I understand it, was purchased back in the early 2000s,
way before any of the allegations in this case. The rubber plant is, again, as $I$ understand it, was
funded -- purchased entirely with a loan in India; had nothing to do with U.S. donors.

These entities that are, quote, for profit, they use that profit for the charitable purposes. But I think, your Honor, that the evidence is going to show that perhaps with the exception of the hospital, where people make medical -- where there may be some donations to the hospital and so forth, these entities -- for example, the soccer team.

The soccer team is -- has nothing to do with GFA. Nothing to do with GFA. It's associated with a particular diocese, I think, in India that's part of the Believers Church. Again, Believers Church has many, many churches within its umbrella, many diocese, and some of those diocese have certain organizations that they are connected to, but it has nothing to do with the monies that are given by U.S. donors here. I think that's what the evidence is going to -- is going to show.

So this whole idea of monies are being raised for children and they, in fact, don't get to children -I mean, for example, your Honor, the Murphys who are here today, as I understand looking at their records,
much of their dol- -- many of their dollars were given to children, and they wrote letters to these children and the children wrote them back.

Your Honor pointed out the 1 anguage that was on the donation slips, and $I$ think the one that's attached in the complaint is 2012, perhaps. But in looking at the Dicksons' records -- excuse me, the Murphys' records, if you look in the statement for January of 2008-- which you don't have. I mean, these were produced in the documents that the plaintiffs now have produced by the -- by the Murphys -- it has the same 1anguage. It has the same, "We'11 do our best to" --

THE COURT: Is that an IRS-required disclaimer?
MR. MOWREY: Your Honor, Mr. Stanley mentioned. I'm not sure that it is a required disclaimer. I think certainly the fact that you didn't receive other goods is a -- has to be there because if, in fact, it did receive other, you know, goods, then the cost of those goods has to be deducted from the contribution. So I think that is a requirement.

But when you say that -- this statement that al1 contributions to Gospe1 for Asia - and I'm reading the one here from Jan- - for the Murphys of January 2008: "A11 contributions to Gospel for Asia are income tax deductible unless otherwise indicated and are made
with the understanding that GFA has complete discretion and control over the use of all donated funds. However, we are committed to apply your gifts according to your designations."

So it has the same -- it's Bates stamped M4, yes, M4.

So that language has not been -- that wasn't created after the ECFA came out. That 1 anguage has been there.

And one of the reasons, your Honor, we think that this case can never be certified is that people give for all sorts of reasons. I mean, the Murphys in this case, for example, and the Dicksons, which are here, are former employees. They gave some of their money for that. There are people, the Murphys, who have given for children and then there's others that give for hospital or medical work.

So the reasons that people give are going to be myriad, and --

THE COURT: I take it you would agree that no one gave because they believed they were going to be defrauded?

MR. MOWREY: Of course not, yes. I mean, of course not, knowing --

THE COURT: Isn't that the thumbs-up or
thumbs-down question? I mean, people can give for lots of different reasons; but if they gave and, if established, if credible and established that monies were not used, then what difference does it make what was, you know, pulling at the heartstrings or what motivated any particular donor?

MR. MOWREY: This is -- this is the -- in the 45-page complaint or whatever it is, the crux of the complaint, it's on Paragraph 45 of the complaint. This is the -- this is the allegation.

If you turn to Page 34, Paragraph 45, here's what the plaintiffs have to prove in order to prevail at class cert: Every single donation, the Murphys -- and you can add in there and every other class member -made to GFA was made only with the understanding based entirely on defendants' representations that 100 percent of the donation would be applied exactly as designated. The defendants misdirected the Murphys' donated to GFA for purposes the Murphys did not designate.

Here's the critical sentence: Had the Murphys known defendants would not apply 100 percent of every donation exactly as they designated, they would not have donated to GFA.

Now, your Honor, in my mind it stretches the imagination to believe that that allegation is true to
every donor. What if 90 percent went? Would some people give and some people not? Of course. What if 80? What if 60? One person gives because they know someone there at the organization; one gives because they have been -- they sponsor a child who has been writing them.

We understand that there are people that make -- donors that make trips to India unannounced to the GFA organization to locate their child. We understand that not one person has ever said, "I couldn't find my child."

So in order for the plaintiffs to prevail, that statement that they make, the last sentence of Paragraph 45 has to be true for every person in the class, and I think that is just beyond credibility and that's why ultimately $I$ don't think this Court will be able to -just on the certification issue, much less the merits -certify this case.

THE COURT: All right. Your answer raises standing as an affirmative defense. Tell me what that's about.

MR. MOWREY: Well, as a general proposition, if you give money to your church or wherever you give it, you do not have standing to sue. Once the money is given -- and different states handle this in different
ways. Some states would say that is an issue for the attorney general to take up.

So the general proposition is that a donor does not have standing once they have given the money. Now, that is the general proposition. There are certainly exceptions.

If money has been raised -- I mean, they allege fraud -- and this is an area that we will need to develop in terms of just the legal portion -- but it seems to me there is a difference in saying we want you to give money for a specific purpose, and we get that $\$ 100$ from a donor and then we put it in our pocket. That is one situation, which I don't think they will be able to prove.

The other situation is, we want $\$ 100$ for a specific situation and we didn't get the $\$ 100$ to the particular situation as quickly as we should; or, we got it done in a manner that isn't according to what the plaintiffs would like it to be done. Because, again, what was done here and -- historically was that when money was given here, the request was fulfilled in India, with funds in India, so that when the Murphys gave money to a child or when monies were given to -those requests were fulfilled.

I mean, money is fungible, your Honor. Even if
the monies -- even if you could trade -- even if the monies were given directly, they're going to be collected in an account and money -- you know, there's going to be a check written on an account.

I mean, it's not like the $\$ 100$ that a person gives, you know, has ink on it and you can -- when it leaves you and the hundred dollars ends up -- that same hundred dollars ends up somewhere, where it's supposed to be.

The important thing is that if $\$ 100,000$ was raised for children that $\$ 100,000$ went to those children. Seems to me that is the -- that's what the donors expected, and that's what I think we'll be able to prove.

THE COURT: So it's not Article III standing that you're premising this on?

MR. MOWREY: No.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. MOWREY: No, it's not Article III standing, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. You also raise statute of limitations.

MR. MOWREY: Right.
THE COURT: What is the statute of limitations and what is the accrual date?

MR. MOWREY: I'm actually glad you raised that question, your Honor, because it relates to a dispute that we have with the plaintiffs with respect to discovery. I think they have asked for the past ten years, or something of that sort. We have offered to go back to 2012. We think that four years from - back from the date the Dicksons filed their lawsuit -- the Dicksons filed their lawsuit in -- I believe in February of '16 and so 1 imitations would be tolled during that time.

So we think that four years is an appropriate time to go back. RICO is four years. Of course, they implicate their unjust enrichment claims, their fraud claims. States - different states have different statute of imitations. So we think that four years is going to catch most of the claims that they would have. Now, with respect to -- they would say, "We11, we didn't know about this fraud. We didn't know about this." First of al1, I heard Mr. Stanley just say today that people have been looking at this for years; and in their own complaint, they take public information to prove the -- prove their case. It's on one of their exhibits it goes back to -- it's Exhibit 5 in their complaint.

If you look at their complaint, Exhibit 5, this
is the document that they put together from public sources, I suppose, and it goes back to 2007.

So the point is here this was not a -- being liberal to the plaintiffs. If it was a fraud, it wasn't a fraud that was covered up because they've got information in their own complaint that goes back to 2007.

So we think that the statute of limitations, your Honor, there needs to be some reasonable time for discovery and then we believe that they are not going to go behind the -- be longer than the statute of limitations; for example, the discovery rule is just not going to apply here because of admissions they have already made in their own complaint.

THE COURT: Did Gospel for Asia use its certification by ECFA as part of its, for lack of a better word, marketing or appeal to donors?

MR. MOWREY: Well, the ECFA, your Honor, Gospel for Asia was a founding member of the ECFA. What Gospel for Asia was doing in terms of a number of the points that were raised by ECFA, ECFA looked at them every year.

So it wasn't until 2015 or whenever it was that they come up with this laundry list of items. Our folks had many meetings with them about this, and as you can
see from the letter itself, many of these items they have begun to change their procedures, and there's no question but that ultimately the GFA would like to get back in the good graces of ECFA.

There are -- there are many religious organizations that are part -- say they are a part of the ECFA, and it is clearly an important aspect to their ministry, and their ministry has been hurt because they are not part of the ECFA.

So the fact is that, as I understand it -- and I think the discovery will bear out -- is that even though we wanted to continue to work with ECFA, ECFA wrote the letter -- and they had the right, I suppose, to do that -- but again, you know, when you get behind what is in the ECFA letter, it really has to do with accounting and certain things that they were doing; for example, holding these large amounts of money that the ECFA did not like.

There was nothing in there about, "Well, there's millions of dollars that are lining the pockets" or they are just, they can't be accounted for. And that's why, your Honor, we have -- we would like to think that if, once we produce these GAAP audits, that that will tie the -- sort of the loose ends for the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: All right. On the concealment issue, though, to the extent that Gospel for Asia was using the certification symbol, kind of like somebody that makes toasters might put the UL symbol on the box of their toaster, when they advertise it for sale, do you think that noncompliance and findings in subsequent years that Gospel for Asia -- and again, I realize this is one-sided, but if the idea is that they were, at the same time, in effect, representing to donors that they were complying with all of the provisions required by the ECFA when, in fact, they weren't, is that evidence of concealment that would at least warrant discovery back beyond what you would contend to be a bar date set by the filing of a complaint in 2016?

MR. MOWREY: Your Honor, ECFA looked at I don't know -- I think it was an annual basis. They looked regularly at GFA and had no issues with them until this came up.

All of the facts that were -- that ECFA came up with, these were not concealed by anyone. I mean, these were --

THE COURT: So were these issues that had developed within the fiscal year of the audit?

MR. MOWREY: Well, some of these had been going on before and ECFA had not had an issue with them.

Again, this was not -- this was not someone coming in and discovering something that was hidden from them. It's just that it wasn't until this time that ECFA came up with these findings.

Now, your Honor, this gets a little -- this will be developed in discovery, and you'll hear this. There has been quite a bit of turmoil within the GFA organization on the, what I'll call the ecclesiastical side. There are a number of disgruntled employees. There were issues over governance. There is a blogger that regularly blogs. I'm certain that there will be something about this hearing on his blog because he follows the PACER regularly in everything that comes out, and there are a group of people that are -- they -it's a little bit of a family feud between these ex-employees and GFA.

This all happened around the time that the ECFA issues came up. So again, the issues that are involved in the ECFA letter, none of these were hidden from ECFA. These were -- all these facts were available to them at any -- the years before or whatever. It's just that at that particular time, they decided that they would raise these as issues. And I think that's what the facts are going to -- our facts are going to bear out.

THE COURT: All right. The Dickinsons are here
today. I only looked at their complaint very -- on a very, very cursory basis, and I understand that there was a -- they were employees of some sort, and there was an arbitration clause in some sort of employment agreement or something like that and that there was a motion to compel arbitration, and Judge Holmes denied that and the Eighth Circuit accepted an interlocutory appeal and stayed discovery in that case.

Just so I understand -- and that's all I know about it. Supposing that the Eighth Circuit were to affirm Judge Holmes, are the causes of action in that complaint substantially similar to the allegations in this complaint such that y'all would be looking to consolidate these matters, or do you view -- from your perspective, do you view these as two separate sets of allegations?

MR. MOWREY: So two responses for that. First of all, the allegations are substantially similar. I mean, the individual facts with respect to the Murphys are different than the Dicksons, the most glaring one being that there is not an arbitration provision. But there's also differences, I'm sure, once we get into discovery as to why they each gave and why they gave funds.

But with respect to the causes of action, they
are identical; and all the various color that the plaintiffs put around their allegations, they are identical.

In response to your question about would we be looking to consolidate, I don't have an answer for that, your Honor. I haven't thought about it really. The Eighth Circuit -- I don't know if you saw this on the docket -- they have accepted all the briefing is done, and they -- oh, there's a reply. They've indicated it will be set for oral argument. So there will be an oral argument. So I assume that there will be a decision sometime in the future.

Now, by the time that decision comes down, whenever that may be, given our pretty aggressive discovery schedule here, we're going to be pretty far into discovery in this case.

THE COURT: Well, would the Dicksons be members of the class that the plaintiffs are seeking to certify, such that it wouldn't make a difference?

MR. MOWREY: They would be. They would be a member. I mean, as the plaintiffs have defined their class, they would be -- they would be members. Again, another reason as to why a case can't be certified.

I mean, if you look at these ex-employees, they have employment -- they have arbitration agreements.

THE COURT: A11 right. We11, that was very entightening, Mr. Mowrey. I appreciate that.

Mr. Stanley, we kind of need to get to dates and deadlines, but I'11 give you just a couple moments to respond if you'd 1 ike.

MR. STANLEY: And I actually had what I think is either a hair brain idea or a brilliant idea, one of the two.

As I say, I've worked with Rob Mowrey before, and I think he's a great lawyer. And I think that if what he's saying is right, there's just an easy solution to this.

He said that all the money was deployed as specified, and what you should know -- you don't know -is that they had ledger accounts. So if you gave to a donkey, there's a ledger account, said "donkey"; and if you gave to a Jesus Well, it went there. There are hundreds of these ledger accounts with specific dollar amounts per year as to what came in, okay? So this is empirically very easy.

He said the important thing is that if 100,000 is raised for children, then 100,000 went to children, and that's their position. And I said to the Court, and I'11 say it right now: If that's the case, we 1ose; we have a terrible case.

It seems to me empirically if what they are saying is true, why don't we have the Court appoint an accountant, we'11 split the cost, they give the information and let the Court get an independent accountant to come out and look at this and just say, "Give them all the information; you have the proof that the money went as raised went exactly as it said. Give it to the accountant for those years."

The accountant says, "Judge, they're right, pour the plaintiffs out," I'11 offer a judgment right now; and if it's wrong, then we have the independent accountant that's done the look, and we save time and money for both sides.

THE COURT: So, in effect, appoint a special master --

MR. STANLEY: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: -- who would employ forensic accountants and dig into this. I tell you what. I will let you visit with Mr. Mowrey on your time about that.

MR. STANLEY: We11, and if they don't agree, maybe we'11 still file a motion for the appointment of a special master because $I$ think that might be the most efficient way since empirically that's really the rub here.

It's not whether someone 1 ined their pockets or
he's not as bad as Tilton or he didn't have a big airplane or whatever else. It's exactly what we said here: If 100,000 was raised for children and it went for children, great; but if it didn't, then that's what our complaint is.

And so we're doing a -- we disagree with a lot of the stuff that they said, but $I$ don't want to go piecemeal with that, but it just seems to me that that's the easiest solution. Put your money where your mouth is; and if it went exactly as said, just give us the proof and let's let a special master figure it out.

THE COURT: All right. Well --
MR. MOWREY: Your Honor -- well --
THE COURT: Mr. Mowrey, you want to --
MR. MOWREY: I didn't want to really address that, your Honor, but what I would -- could we look for a minute at the case management? The case management report sets forth, has four pages of items they want. We have no problem in giving them most of what they want.

The rub is -- and this is where I think we need guidance from the Court. The rub is that they want -they say QuickBooks backup files, complete quarterly year-end financial statements, yearly tax filings and so forth, and they list Believers Church, Gospel for

Asia-India, Last Hour Ministries.
These are all entities that are not defendants in this case. They're Indian entities. He's going to be asking for documents from those. He says K. P. Yohannan can just snap his fingers and get them, and we say that is not the case.

And Mr. Stanley and I, we do have a history. We absolutely don't want to burden the Court with petty disputes. We've been at this long enough for that. But on this issue, we're going to have -- we have a -- we're going to have a dispute about this.

THE COURT: Well, did funds from U.S. donors -well, did Gospel for Asia send money, provide money, give money to these Indian entities?

MR. MOWREY: Yes, and that's why we have said we think that these audits that were done for the American auditors should satisfy Mr. Stanley on this. He's got --

MR. STANLEY: May I ask a question, your Honor?
MR. MOWREY: What he is going to -- what he's saying is that, "No, we want the bank statements from all these entities, we want the QuickBooks, the backup files, all of their documents." And we can't -- our position is we can't give those.

THE COURT: Well, would you --

MR. MOWREY: They're not under our control.
THE COURT: Would you produce the auditors for deposition?

MR. MOWREY: We're certainly going to produce -- we're going to produce their reports, and I'm not even sure -- were these Indian auditors that did them? I'm not sure they're under our control.

I mean, if --
THE COURT: I mean, the problem is in the United States we have, you know, certifications for public accounting and there's GAAP and so on and so forth.

MR. MOWREY: Exactly.
THE COURT: Maybe you know. I don't know what -- are you saying that these foreign entities were audited based on GAAP?

MR. MOWREY: Exactly, your Honor. As I understand it, in order for the new accountant -- GFA had new accountants the last couple of years; and in order for those accountants to give an unqualified audit, they requested that there be GAAP audits done of these entities that monies were given to from GFA-USA and that was what was done. These were audits that were done in order to satisfy the auditors here.

THE COURT: But isn't that kind of a whole -- I
mean, the -- well, I don't know what level of access that the United States auditors had to the actual documents by the Indian entities. So maybe it's good or maybe it's bad, but it sounds kind of like a garbage in/garbage out sort of deal potentially.

If the source of their information can't be tested, perhaps they took it at face value; perhaps the plaintiffs will not.

MR. MOWREY: Well, your Honor, I'm not saying they -- I mean, the auditors, in order for them to produce an audit or give an unqualified opinion, they requested this; it was apparently done. I don't think those auditors would put their name on the line unless they thought that what was given them was sufficient, unless I'm not understanding.

THE COURT: Well, perhaps I need to let y'all visit about that because I'm not fully understanding and appreciating some of the nuances here.

I thought you were saying that the auditors of Gospel for Asia requested information in the course of conducting an audit for Gospel for Asia. What I didn't hear you say was that there is an audit for these Indian entities.

MR. MOWREY: No, no, that is -- there are -there is an audit for these Indian entities. That's the
point.
THE COURT: That the U.S. auditors audited the Indian entities?

MR. MOWREY: They did not audit the entities, but they requested audits by -- to be done by Indian auditors according to GAAP, and they had to certify it in India in order for the U.S. auditors to sign off. So these were done by Indian -- yes, these were -- these are Indian chartered accountants.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. STANLEY: Your Honor -- sorry.
THE COURT: I was going to say this is -that's probably a little bit beyond the scope that I'm able to absorb and make rulings on today.

MR. MOWREY: Yes, I understand.
MR. STANLEY: I do want to add one more confession, since $I$ made some earlier.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. STANLEY: When I -- I have a lead foot, but when I'm driving next to a policeman, I usually try not to pass the policeman. The audits that they are talking about in the last two years, after they got in a fight with Bland Garvey and they had to get their new accountant, all of that is relatively new. So I wouldn't -- I don't know if I'd put much into that, but
it's certainly not for the years in dispute here.
Regardless of that, the point that Mr. Mowrey raised is interesting. If the only defendant was Gospel for Asia, it might be harder for us to say, "Yeah, give us these -- al1 these books and records."

So if the only hat he was wearing is "I represent Gospe1 for Asia," it might be a tougher case for us. But he represents, and they appeared without qualification, for K. P. Yohannan, and we've offered evidence in here - and it's in the ECFA report and then we'11 offer -- we've got tons of evidence -- that the property is in his name, that we say came from our donations; that the entities are controlled by him.

Notwithstanding what Mr. Mowrey says, I've got tons of evidence that he still controls these entities and that he signs off on major transactions. And if he has that kind of control, the rules of discovery says if it's in your custody or control. And if those documents are in his control, then we want them.

If they are not in his control, you know, we'11 have to take that up on -- if he swears and he sits in that witness stand and swears he has no control, he may be subject to perjury but we'11 see what happens. I can't do anything about that.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Stanley also said
that they may not be willing, for class purposes, to provide you with information and documents that is donor-specific. What is your position on that?

MR. STANLEY: The issue is really, to prove class certification, we have to prove numerosity. If they'11 stipulate to that, we don't need it.

It's commonality and typicality, if they are saying it's all the same or they are saying they're different, then we may need to get into it to see what the donors gave.

I think there's a way that we can work with them without getting necessarily donor specific to show that donors gave to these categories that he enunciated earlier. That may be a shortcut for that.

My goal is not to take -- my understanding is there's 100,000 donors roughly per year. I don't really want to talk about all -- go down and take depositions and get all their stories. I'm really trying to look in the aggregate to go for class certification; what's this case about.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else?
MR. STANLEY: No, sir.
THE COURT: Al1 right.
MR. MOWREY: Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. MOWREY: Can I bring up one other point?
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. MOWREY: That has to do with search terms and custodians. Yesterday we -- well, back at our conference a few -- month or two ago, whenever it was, when we discussed this, plaintiffs said that they were not prepared at that time to give us custodians or terms; they wanted to see some documents.

We produced some documents. Of course, they got a number of documents. Yesterday we sent them a letter with proposed custodians, as well as some search terms and then we received back from them a list of 35 or so terms.

And also, even though they didn't give any other custodians, the specific names, they said, "We believe there are custodians at Believers Church and GFA-India who should be included in the initial custodian list."

So there are a couple of issues here. We haven't really had a chance to examine all of their search terms but, for example, we listed ten custodians, or purported custodians, and we gave terms such as audit, F-6, designation report, transfer within five words of wire or cash transfer, that sort of thing.

In their thirty terms, we have things like

Jesus Wells, Bridge of Hope, Believers Chapel, GFA-India.

If you'll look at the totality of their terms, essentially 100 percent or near 100 percent of every e-mail that all these people have written would be caught in these terms, and it seems to me that the idea of the terms is to try to, best you can, to narrow the group of documents that have to be gone through to determine what are relevant.

And again, $I$ realize this is a little bit of the weeds, but I wanted some -- I'm bringing this up to get some guidance, if possible, because otherwise, we're going to have a huge amount of documents that will be captured by these searches, and a great number of them, a huge number of them will have nothing at all to do with the issues in this lawsuit.

THE COURT: All right. I think $I$ got it.
Well, I have reviewed all the materials. I think I have, from a high altitude anyway, understanding of each side's position.

I think because of the nature of the allegations and the causes of action being fraud of a level involving diversions, alleged diversions of donated money in the context of many, many entities and subentities, $I$ think that there is going to be a
tremendous overlap between class discovery and merits discovery. And, of course, the Court's required to wade into the merits to a certain extent in performing its rigorous analysis at the class certification level.

This is one of those cases that $I$ think that if we attempted to bifurcate discovery, then defining the boundaries where the overlap ends would consume much more of our time fighting about it than would make any efficiencies to be gained worth it. So $I^{\prime} m$ going to put in place a scheduling order that envisions combined class and merits discovery.

I am sensitive to the issue, if the concern is that there's not, at the certification phase, a need to identify names, the actual names of donors who may have been under the impression that, you know, their names would not be disclosed. And in the absence of a good reason why the plaintiffs would need to know the actual names, then $I$ can certainly see why that would not be appropriate at this point.

So what I'm going to throw out here is two things. First, I'm going to give you some dates and deadlines that $I$ would propose, and if you'd kind of write these down, and then if you have a major heartburn about the approach or any particular deadiine or time frame in between these deadlines, then we can talk about
them, but I've got to put something on the board to begin with.

And then $I$ want to take up my thoughts on discovery and proportionality, and I don't know that I'm going to be able to resolve any of the specific things that you've raised, but at least generally we can talk about it.

So $I$ would propose that the -- that there be a deadline for plaintiffs filing of any motion for class certification to be no later than January 19 th of 2018. Of course, "no later than" does not preclude you from filing it earlier.

The defendants' response would be due six weeks after the filing of the class certification motion, and the plaintiffs would be given advance permission to file a reply not later than three weeks after the filing of defendants' response.

I would propose that we set a hearing on the motion for class certification tentatively for April 13th of 2018, and that date, if the briefing -- that date kind of contemplates that the motion for class certification is filed on January $19 t h$.

If it's filed substantially earlier than that, then we would pull that date down and find a date closer to when the briefing is completed.

Contemplating that the deadine or that the date that the class certification motion would be filed on January 19th, I set some deadlines for class certification disclosures. If you're going to file sooner than that, then I'11 have to figure out a way to articulate that, but $I$ was going to suggest October $15 t h$ of this year for plaintiffs' class certification expert disclosures and that the defense provide their disclosures on November 30th. That's 45 -- effectively 45 days 1 ater.

I was going to propose an overall discovery deadline of November 16th of 2018, followed by a dispositive motion deadline of December 7 th of 2017 for dispositive motions and/or, to the extent applicable, motions to decertify; and then $I$ was going to propose that we set the matter for a three-week trial to begin on Apri1 15th of 2019.

Let me ask the plaintiffs first, Mr. Stanley, your thoughts.

MR. STANLEY: Your Honor, that would be fine. On the expert thing, that's something we can work out with each other if we file early. And we may not even have an expert for class cert; so that may obviate the need for that, but we' 11 work that out with Mr. Mowrey if we do that earlier. But $I$ generally understand that
what the Court's saying is they should have at least 45 days for rebuttal expert.

THE COURT: Right.
Mr. Mowrey?
MR. MOWREY: Your Honor, we are fine with those dates. There is one other date I wanted to bring to the Court's attention that was in the case management plan and that is the date by which plaintiffs are required to amend their complaint.

Your standard order has -- states whether 90 days is sufficient. They have asked for 180 , and we think 90 is sufficient.

The problem with 180 is that we'll be substantially into discovery, if not about the end of discovery, when they could amend their complaint and so it would throw the dates off that the Court has just specified.

MR. STANLEY: Your Honor, the problem we have is we don't know what we don't know; and while Mr. Mowrey is correct and gave us 10,088 documents, 7,035 of them -- or 70 percent -- were checks and deposit slips that we can do nothing with.

So we don't know what we don't know; and if other documents come up that might better -- in discovery that might better inform how we amend our
pleading, that's what we're really looking for.
I don't know how else to deal with it.
THE COURT: Can you live with five months?
MR. STANLEY: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right. So motion to amend or add parties, $I$ 'll back that up a couple days and make it October 13th.

MR. STANLEY: I assume we're saying that's without leave and that later if something is discovered, then we can always seek leave?

THE COURT: Well, actually that's not right. I think you still need to seek leave.

MR. STANLEY: Oh, for that?
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. STANLEY: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Because you don't want to deprive the defendants of the ability to object for whatever reason may be germane.

MR. SHULTS: Your Honor, excuse me.
When you were talking about dates and deadlines, the December 7 date after the discovery cutoff, is that dispositive motions?

THE COURT: Dispositive motions and/or, if appropriate, based on the posture of the issues at that time, a motion for decertification.

MR. SHULTS: I think you may have said 2017, but we're talking about 2018; is that correct?

THE COURT: If I said 2017, I was mistaken. 2018, yes.

MR. SHULTS: Thank your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Let's take up some of the other issues. I think that defendants had agreed, or perhaps the parties had agreed to complete the production of agreed -- the agreed document exchange with the initial disclosures by May 25 th. Are we still on track for that date?

MR. MOWREY: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Very, very much appreciate that.

There's also a reference to, that y'all have already -- or were getting ready to set a date for an early mediation. Have y'all -- is that right?

MR. STANLEY: No, sir. We have a mediator picked out.

MR. MOWREY: We have a mediator picked out and we've discussed mediation. That's a discussion we need to have in terms of when we do that. I think the thinking was, when we met, was that we do have a mediation sooner rather than later.

THE COURT: Okay. With regard to discovery
limitations or restrictions, $I$ just don't have enough -of enough nuanced knowledge about the heartland of the, categorically, the types of evidence that exist to give y'al1 any specific direction.

Generally speaking, it would be my view that if Gospe1 for Asia gave money, paid money, whatever the proper term is, to some other entity, then -- let me put it this way: If a forensic accountant would need to check off an account for that money in order to see the whole picture, then my view would be that is discoverable, to the extent that Gospel for Asia owns or controls those entities, or if any of the individual defendants owns or controls those entities.

My understanding from looking at the - I'm not sure where $I$ saw it, but it was quoted about Mr. Yohannan, it sounds 1 ike he's kind of the hub, and there's a whole bunch of spokes that go out from there. But if he, in effect, has de facto ability to control the finances, deposits, disbursements from these entities, then I'm likely to conclude that that's fair game.

MR. MOWREY: And, your Honor, I fully appreciate that. I must say it is our position that he does not, and $I$ don't think there will be evidence that he does. So that is a - that is a major point of
dispute between us and the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' position is that he does, and our position is that he does not. So that's clearly a --

THE COURT: Well, sounds like you've got to get
a $30(b)(6)$ witness or Mr. Yohannan under oath and go from there.

MR. MOWREY: Right. I agree, your Honor.
THE COURT: With regard to temporal scope, again, $I$ don't really kind of have an appreciation for the significance of when certain facts took place, to the extent that these allegations can be called a scheme to defraud, when the scheme began, when different defendants began their participations. I just don't have that sort of information. But for purposes of discovery, the Court would not believe in a case such as this that the discovery date would be coexistent with the latest arguable bar date.

By the sake token, I don't know that going back ten years is necessary. So, you know, if y'all could find something that makes sense, I don't think that I'm going to dictate that today because I just don't understand the nuances of where we're playing here. But, you know, certainly something closer to ten years would be my impression today rather than four years, but I'11 leave that to y'all to discuss.

With regard to mechanical imitations on the quantity of discovery, this is a case where $I$ think that an amount of interrogatories, more than 25 per side would be appropriate. I don't know what other documents or questions that the defendants may have for the plaintiffs that have not been taken care of in initial exposures, but -- I'm not going to envision how it may be.

What $I$ am going to do is $I$ am going to allow 25 interrogatories per party, or defendant; and to the extent that that is insufficient, then you can move for leave to request more. And if the Court finds that you've made judicious use of all 25 for each defendant, then perhaps we'11 authorize more, but I would ask you to make good use of that. The same will apply for requests for admissions.

As it relates to depositions, I'm going to initially allow 20 nonparty depositions. So in total, you will have 20 depositions, plus the named individual defendants, plus $30(\mathrm{~b})(6)$ depositions of each entity. And to the extent that they designate more than one deponent for $30(b)(6)$ purposes, that still counts as one.

Then let's see where you are, and if you're still plowing fertile ground, and you can establish that
to the Court's satisfaction, then the Court will entertain more. If the Court believes that you're just burdening the defendants and you're not really plowing ground, you're just trying to harass or embarrass people, that's different. So that will be the Court's order on depositions.

With regard to discovery in general, if the defendants perceive that there's a lack of proportionality, then you need to talk to the plaintiffs about that and express to them what the problems are, quantify what the problems are.

I mean, it makes perfect sense to me that you'd call up Mr. Stanley and say, "Do you realize that if we put in 'Jesus' into one of our search terms, you're going to basically capture 90 percent of everything that we have sent or received, that doesn't make a whole lot of sense to me. It's going to cause us a lot of work to find all that, and it's going to cause you a bunch of work that's not meaningful." That's just kind of common sense.

So certainly anywhere where you think that, even if it's discoverable, the way it's being asked for is not proportional, then that's a very valid basis and that's something that y'all need to use common sense. There's a whole roomful of very seasoned, skilled
lawyers, and y'all know what makes sense and what doesn't. I mean, you may have reasonable differences, but $I$ fully trust that $y$ 'all can work out something; and if all else fails, you know, agree to two phases. Agree to some more low-hanging fruit first.

You know, if you contend there's nothing there in all these search terms but you can agree, then go ahead and get started on the first batch. You see what's there; after you see what's there, you may withdraw something that's in your Phase 2 set. But use common sense and if you can't, you know, agree to it, then obviously get us on the phone and we will make a relevance and a proportionality consideration.

Sometimes, Mr. Stanley, if I think it's relevant but they tell me what the cost is and $I$ just think that that sounds credible and you're trying to get to Nth degree and it's just kind of out of proportion and you really want to do it, I may ask you to pull your checkbook out and show me how much you want it and pay them to produce it. So we've got a lot of different tools that we can use.

I think that that is all the territory that $I$ wanted to cover today. I'm happy to answer any other questions that you may have about our local procedures or any other issues that you think are imperative to
take up today.
Mr. Stanley?
MR. STANLEY: No, sir.
THE COURT: Mr. Mowrey?
MR. MOWREY: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. I want to thank all of y'all for personally attending today. I think it is very, very helpful in complex cases such as this to actually meet in the same room and at least -- of course, you guys know each other, being from Dallas, but it's always nice to see the face and shake the hand of some person before you start litigation in earnest. It might make you not say bad words to them over the phone. There's something about it being harder to cuss somebody if you've shaken their hands, but sometimes.

MR. STANLEY: Plus, he's my neighbor. I've got to be really careful.

THE COURT: There you have it. All right. Again, and thank you to the -- Mr. Murphy for attending today, and we're adjourned.
(Proceedings adjourned at 3:34 p.m.)

CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER

I, Dana Hayden, Federal Official Realtime Court
Reporter, in and for the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, do hereby certify that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States Code that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the stenographically reported proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and that the transcript page format is in conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

Dated this 18th day of May, 2017.
Digitally signed by Dana Hayden, CCR, RMR, CRR
DN: $\mathrm{cn}=$ Dana Hayden, CCR, RMR, CRR, $\mathrm{o}=$ United States Western District Court of Arkansas, Fayetteville Division, ou=Official Court Reporter for the Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, email=Dana_Hayden@arwd.uscourts.gov, $\mathrm{c}=$ US Date: 2017.05.18 08:49:37-05'00'

Dana Hayden, CCR, RMR, CRR Federal Official Court Reporter

appreciated [1] - 3:19 appreciating [1] -
59:18
appreciation [1] - 72:9
approach [1] - 65:24
approaches [2]-9:20, 19:10
appropriate [6] - 9:15, 19:23, 47:11, 65:19, 69:24, 73:4
approval [1] - 27:3
April [2] - 66:19, 67:17
arbitration [4]-52:4,
52:6, 52:21, 53:25
area [3]-14:17, 14:20, 45:8
areas [4]-28:17,
35:24, 36:3, 36:12
arguable [1] - 72:17
argument [2] - 53:10,
53:11
ARKANSAS [2] - 1:1,
1:15
Arkansas [5] - 1:25,
2:4, 2:15, 4:24, 77:5
Article [2] - 46:15, 46:19
articulate [1] - 67:6
Asia [37]-3:3, 3:22, 3:23, 3:25, 4:5, 4:8, 11:10, 11:12, 12:3, 12:5, 14:16, 15:6, 19:11, 19:17, 23:16, 23:22, 25:11, 27:13, 27:22, 33:2, 34:1, 41:22, 41:24, 48:15, 48:19, 48:20, 50:2, 50:7, 57:1, 57:13, 59:20, 59:21, 61:4,
61:7, 71:6, 71:11
ASIA [3] - 1:7, 1:7,
10:18
Asia-Canada [1] 25:11
Asia-Germany [1] -
27:22
Asia-India [2] - 11:10, 57:1
ASIA-
INTERNATIONAL [1]
$-1: 7$
Asia-international [1] - 27:13
aspect [2] - 26:2, 49:7
aspects [1] $-4: 10$
assets [1] - 39:2
associated [3] - 8:18, 39:14, 40:13
assume [2]-53:11, 69:8
assuming [1] - 20:10 assumptions [1] -
33:22
asterisk [1] - 15:16 attached [2] - 29:25, 41:5
attempted [1] - 65:6
attending [2] - 76:7,
76:19
attention [1] - 68:7
attorney [2] - 8:25, 45:2
attorneys [2] - 21:12,
22:4
attorneys' [2] - 6:25, 8:7
audible [1] - 28:22
audit [13]-25:11,
25:12, 25:13, 27:6, 37:17, 50:23, 58:21, 59:11, 59:21, 59:22, 59:25, 60:4, 63:23
audited [4] - 24:25,
25:2, 58:16, 60:2
auditors [14]-26:25,
37:17, 38:5, 57:17,
58:2, 58:6, 58:24,
59:2, 59:10, 59:13, 59:19, 60:2, 60:6, 60:7
audits [12] - 25:5, 25:8, 27:2, 37:12, 37:18, 38:2, 49:23, 57:16, 58:21, 58:23, 60:5, 60:21
August [2] - 31:20, 31:24
authority [3] - 10:25,
11:5, 27:11
authorize [2]-21:9, 73:14
available [2] - 7:15, 51:20
Avenue [3]-2:4, 2:14, 2:19

| $\mathbf{B}$ |
| :---: |
| backup $[2]-56.23$ |

backup [2] - 56:23, 57:22
bad [3] - 56:1, 59:4, 76:13
balance [1] - 23:18
bank [2]-24:7, 57:21
banks [1] - 10:14
bar [2] - 50:13, 72:17
based [5] - 9:21,
33:22, 43:15, 58:16, 69:24
basis [6] - 5:5, 22:6,

22:7, 50:16, 52:2, 74:23
Bassett [3]-2:3, 2:3, 3:10
batch [1] - 75:8
Bates [1] - 42:5
bear [2] - 49:11, 51:24
becoming [1] - 22:12
beef [1] - 18:17
BEFORE [1]-1:13
befuddling [1] - 27:16
began [2]-72:12, 72:13
begin [3]-6:3, 66:2,
67:16
begins [1] - 20:8
begun [1] - 49:2
behalf $[5]-1: 3,3: 2$,
3:9, 3:12, 6:4
behind [2]-48:11,
49:14
Believers [17] - 10:19,
11:2, 11:3, 11:9,
26:6, 26:7, 26:8,
26:9, 26:11, 26:12, 36:25, 37:2, 40:15, 56:25, 63:16, 64:1
believes [1] - 74:2
bench [1]-8:9
best [5] - 5:17, 5:21, 13:14, 41:12, $64: 7$
bet [2] - 15:19, 15:22
better [3]-48:17, 68:24, 68:25
between [7]-20:8,
27:21, 33:1, 51:15,
65:1, 65:25, 72:1
beyond [3] - 44:15,
50:13, 60:13
bifurcate [3] - 5:23,
20:10, 65:6
bifurcated [5] - 20:5,
20:6, 28:7, 35:18,
36:4
bifurcating [2] - 28:9,
30:11
bifurcation [6] -
22:14, 22:16, 23:10,
35:15, 35:16, 36:17
big [3] - 17:10, 36:16,
56:1
bit [9] - 12:21, 15:16,
19:6, 22:13, 22:22,
51:7, 51:15, 60:13,
64:10
Bland [4]-25:3, 25:9,
27:3, 60:23
bleed [2]-22:17,
23:12
blog [1] - 51:12

CASE [2] - 1:5, 1:12 case [53] - $3: 6,3: 8$,
5:17, 6:20, 8:22,
9:13, 9:18, 9:21,
9:22, 11:22, 12:1,
12:2, 12:4, 12:9,
17:10, 18:19, 18:20,
21:15, 22:19, 22:22,
24:14, 29:19, 29:21,
30:10, 30:25, 35:25,
36:3, 36:5, 36:11,
36:19, 38:11, 38:24,
39:18, 40:1, 42:11,
42:13, 44:18, 47:22,
52:8, 53:16, 53:23,
54:24, 54:25, 56:17,
57:3, 57:6, 61:7,
62:20, 68:7, 72:15,
73:2
cases [3] - 19:8, 65:5,
76:8
cash [1] - 63:24
catch [1] - 47:16
categorically [1] -
71:3
categories [1] - 62:13
Catholic [1] - 26:3
caught [1] - 64:6
causes [7]-4:20, 5:1,
5:5, 18:21, 52:11,
52:25, 64:22
CCR ${ }_{[2]}$ - 1:23, 77:17
Central [1] - 2:8
cert [7]-23:12, 28:25,
29:2, 29:10, 29:12,
43:13, 67:23
certain [11] - 4:5, 4:10,
6:2, 6:23, 12:15,
13:7, 40:17, 49:16,
51:11, 65:3, 72:10
certainly [11] - 14:17,
27:5, 35:20, 38:7,
41:16, 45:5, 58:4,
61:1, 65:18, 72:23,
74:21
CERTIFICATE [1] -
77:1
certification [20] -
5:20, 5:22, 28:13,
28:16, 28:18, 28:24,
44:17, 48:16, 50:3,
62:5, 62:19, 65:4,
65:13, 66:10, 66:14,
66:19, 66:22, 67:2,
67:4, 67:7
certifications [1] 58:10
certified [4] - 36:2,
36:11, 42:11, 53:23
certify [6] - 35:25,

| 36:3, 44:18, 53:18, | 29:12, 35:24, 43:13, | complex [3]-23:13, | contributions [5] | 69:23, 70:3, 70:6, |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 60:6, } 77: 5 \\ & \text { cetera }[1]-19: 23 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 43:14, 44:14, 53:18, } \\ & 53: 22,62: 1,62: 5, \end{aligned}$ | $24: 3,76: 8$ <br> complicated [2] | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 15:5, 31:9, 33:3, } \\ & 41: 22,41: 24 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 70: 13,70: 25,72: 4, \\ & 72: 8,76: 4,76: 6, \end{aligned}$ |
| chain [2]-10:11 | 62:19, 65:1, 65:4 | 20:23, 32: | control [12]-15:8, | 76:18 |
| - 10:18 | 65:11, 66:9, 66:1 | comply [1] - 15:2 | 24:21, 24:22, 42:2, | Court [42] - 1:24, 3:5, |
| chance [2] - 7:3, 63:20 | 66:19, 66:21, 67:2 | complying [1] - 50:10 | 58:1, 58:7, 61:17, | 3:7, 3:15, 3:22, 4:4, |
| change [2]-14:16, | 67:3, 67:7, 67:23 | concealed [1] - 50:20 | 61:18, 61:19, 61:20, | 4:9, 6:6, 6:22, 7:19, |
| 49:2 | clause [1]-52:4 <br> clear [2]-10:22, 12:13 | concealment [2] | $61: 22,71: 18$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 8:9, 9:17, 19:3, 20:1, } \\ & \text { 20:17, 20:19, 21:4, } \end{aligned}$ |
| changed [1] - 13:6 <br> changes [2]-14:22, | clear [2]-10:22, 12:13 <br> clearly [5] - 35:23, | $\begin{aligned} & 50: 1,50: 12 \\ & \text { concept }[1]-12: 22 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { controlled }[4]-23: 18, \\ 24: 1,26: 14,61: 13 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 20:17, 20:19, 21:4, } \\ & \text { 21:5, 21:17, 22:7, } \end{aligned}$ |
| :12 | 36:3, 36:10, 49:7 | 65:1 | controls [5]-19:14 | 18, 28:10, 29:1 |
| channeled [1] - 16:18 | 72:3 | concise [1]-21:1 | 36:23, 61:15, 71:12, | :24, 32:17, 35:2 |
| Chapel ${ }_{[1]}$ - 64:1 | clients [1]-13:9 | conclude [2] - 14:7 | 71:13 | 36:17, 39:1, 44:16, |
| rize | closer [2]-66:24 | 71:20 | cooperate [1]-27: | :23, 55:2, 55:4 |
| 25, 34:5 | 72:23 | conclusions [1] - 34:2 | correct [5] - 6:6, 7:8 | 6:22, 57:8, 68:16, |
| charitable [3]-3:21, | clue [1]-17:4 | conducted [1] - 27:2 | 68:20, 70:2, 77:7 | :15, 73:12, 74:1, |
| 4:18, 40:6 | Code [1] - 77:7 | conducting [1] - 59:21 | correspondence [1] - | 74:2, 77:3, 77:4, |
| Charities [1]-26:3 | coexistent [1] - 72:16 | conference [4]-3:9, | 27:17 | 77:17 |
| charities [1]-13:17 | collected [2] - 33:4, $46: 3$ | $8: 10,20: 18,63: 5$ | $\begin{aligned} & \operatorname{cost}[3]-41: 18,55: 3, \\ & 75: 15 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { court [2] - 19:24, } \\ & 27: 10 \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { charity }[3]-14: 10, \\ 15: 21,18: 3 \end{gathered}$ | collectively $[2]-3: 13$, | Conference [1] 77:11 | counsel [3] - 17: | Court's [6] - 13:25, |
| chartered [1] - 60:9 | 30:7 | confere | 28:3, 28:22 | 65:2, 68:1, 68:7, |
| charts [1] - 24:3 | College [1] - 2: |  | countries [1] - $24: 2$ | 74:1, 74:5 |
| check [3]-39:9, 46:4, | color [1]-53:1 | confession [1] - 60:17 | counts [1]-73:22 | courtroom [1]-7:2 |
| 1:9 | combined [1] - 65: | confidential [6]-6:21, | county [1] - 39:11 | cover [1] - 75:23 |
| checkbook [1] - 75:19 | comfortable [1]-9:10 | $6: 24,7: 2,7: 4,7: 10,$ | couple [8] - 30:21, | covered [3]-29:17, 30:20, 48:5 |
| checks [1]-68:21 | $\text { coming }[2]-23: 22,$ | $7: 12$ | $\begin{aligned} & 33: 8,34: 14,37: 16, \\ & 54: 4,58: 19,63: 19, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 30: 20,48: 5 \\ \text { CPA }_{[1]}-27: 5 \end{gathered}$ |
| child [6] - 17:19, 18:11, 44:5, 44:9, | commissioner | confidentiality [2] $8: 11,21: 13$ | $\begin{aligned} & 54: 4, \\ & 69: 6 \end{aligned}$ | created [1] - 42:8 |
| 44:11, 45:23 | 39:11 | confirmed [2]-31:24, | course [9] - 42:23 | credibility [1] - 44:15 |
| children [12]-40:23, 41:2, 41:3, 42:16, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { commitments }[1] \text { - } \\ & 8: 21 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 32: 21 \\ \text { confor } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 42: 24,44: 2,47: 12, \\ & 59: 20,63: 9,65: 2, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { credible [2] - 43:3, } \\ & 75: 16 \end{aligned}$ |
| 46:11, 46:12, 54:22, | committed [5] - 15:11, | 77:1 | 66:11, 76:1 | critical [1] - 43:20 |
| 56:3, 56:4 | :12, 15:25, 16:9, | connected [1] - 40:18 | COURT [92] - 1:1, 3 : | criticized [2]-13:16, |
| Christians ${ }_{[1]}-18: 12$ |  | consideration [1] 75:13 | 6:13, 6:16, 6:19, 7:5, | $25: 15$ |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { church [11]-10:20, } \\ \text { 10:23, 10:25, 11:6, } \end{gathered}$ | committee [2] - 22:5 common [7]-4:23, | 75:13 <br> consistent ${ }_{[1]}-4: 18$ | 9:9 | $\mathbf{R R}_{[2]}-1: 23,77:$ |
| 10:23, 10:25, 11:6, <br> 19:14, 25:22, 25:25, | 16:2, 16:7, 21:19, | consistent [1] - 4:18 consolidate [2] - | $14: 25,15: 3,15: 5,$ | crux [1] - 43:8 |
| 26:2, 26:4, 31:12, | 74:19, 74:24, 75:1 | 52:14, 53:5 | 15:15, 16:11, 16:14, | current [1]-21:17 |
| 44:23 | commonality [1] - | conspiracy [2] - 10:8, | 18:23, 19:1, 20:3, | cursory [1]-52:2 |
| Church [15]-11:2, | 62:7 |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 21:25, 24:24, 25:16, } \\ & \text { 26:2, 26:6, 26:20, } \end{aligned}$ | cuss [1] - 76:14 <br> custodian [1] - 63 |
| 26:7, 26:8, 26:9, | $23: 15,23: 19$ | constitution [1] - 10:23 | 7:12, 28:4, 28:20 | custodians [8] - 11:2, |
| 26:12, 36:25, 37:2, | compel [2] - 21:10 | constitution's [1] | $30: 3,30: 5,30: 14$ | $3: 4,63: 7,63: 11$ |
| $40: 15,56: 25,63: 16$ |  | $10: 22$ | $33: 9,33: 20,38: 25 \text {, }$ | 63:15, 63:16, 63:21, |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { churches [2] - 25:21, } \\ & 40 \cdot 16 \end{aligned}$ | competent ${ }_{[1]}-27: 5$ | consume [1] - 65:7 contemplates [1] - | 39:19, 41:13, 42:20, | custody [1] - 61:18 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Circuit }[4]-8: 19,52: 7, \\ & 52: 10,53: 7 \end{aligned}$ | complaint [24] - 5:6, 5:19, 12:15, 16:15, | 66:21 | $\begin{aligned} & 42: 25,44: 19,46: 15, \\ & 46: 18,46: 21,46: 24, \end{aligned}$ | cutoff [1] - 69:22 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { circumstances [1] - } \\ & \text { 13:12 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 30: 1,30: 23,30: 24, \\ & 41: 6,43: 8,43: 9, \end{aligned}$ | $67: 1$ conte | $\begin{aligned} & 48: 15,50: 1,50: 22, \\ & 51: 25,53: 17,54: 1, \end{aligned}$ | D |
| civil [1]-4:25 | 47:24, 47:25, | $5: 5,27: 13,28: 5$ | 55:14, 55:17, 56:12, | Dallas [4]-2:9, 2:19, |
| claim [1] - 5:6 | :14, 50:14 | 30:10, 50:13, 75:6 | $: 2,58: 9,58: 14$ | 39:9, 76:10 |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { claims }[3]-47: 13, \\ 47: 14,47: 16 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 52: 1,52: 12,52: 13 \\ & 56: 5,68: 9,68: 15 \end{aligned}$ | contention [1] - 11:25 <br> contentions [1] - 6:6 | 58:25, 59:16, 60:2 | 77:17 |
| class [36] - 5:18, 5:19, | complete [7] - 15:8, | context [2] - 30:6, | $\begin{aligned} & 60: 10,60: 12,60: 18, \\ & 61: 25,62: 21,62: 23, \end{aligned}$ | DANIEL [1] - 1:8 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 5: 23,20: 5,20: 8, \\ & 22: 15,22: 20,23: 12, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 31: 22,37: 17,38: 2, \\ & 42: 1,56: 23,70: 8 \end{aligned}$ | 64:24 | $62: 25,63: 2,64: 17,$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { date [17] - 3:16, 29:1, } \\ 46: 25,47: 7,50: 13, \end{gathered}$ |
| 28:12, 28:16, 28:18, | completed [1] - 66:25 | continue [1]-49:12 | $68: 3,69: 3,69: 5,$ | 66:20, 66:21, 66:24, |
| 28:24, 29:2, 29:10, | completely ${ }_{[1]}$ - 13:1 | $13: 8,41: 19$ | 69:11, 69:14, 69:16, | 67:2, 68:6, 68:8, |

69:21, 70:11, 70:16,
72:16, 72:17
Dated [1] - 77:12
dates [6]-28:24, 54:3, 65:21, 68:6, 68:16,
69:20
DAVID ${ }_{[1]}-1: 8$
Davis [2]-2:18, 3:14 days [10]-7:15, 29:6, 29:8, 29:11, 35:21, 67:10, 68:2, 68:11, 69:6
de [1] - 71:18
deadline [5] - 65:24,
66:9, 67:1, 67:12,
67:13
deadlines [5]-54:4,
65:22, 65:25, 67:3, 69:21
deal [5]-5:18, 20:2,
35:23, 59:5, 69:2
December [4]-29:4, 29:13, 67:13, 69:21
Deceptive [1] - 4:24
decertification [1] 69:25
decertified ${ }_{[1]}-13: 19$
decertify [1]-67:15
decided [1] - 51:22
decision [2]-53:11, 53:13
deducted [1] - 41:19 deductible [2] - 15:6, 41:25
defendant $[7]-1: 10$, 4:6, 24:25, 25:6, 61:3, 73:10, 73:13
defendants [20]-
3:12, 4:3, 4:16, 5:4, 8:23, 9:23, 10:3, 11:21, 27:13, 43:18, 43:21, 57:2, 69:17, 70:7, 71:13, 72:13, 73:5, 73:20, 74:3, 74:8
DEFENDANTS ${ }_{[1]}$ 2:12
defendants' ${ }^{[6]}$ - 4:11,
11:25, 30:6, 43:16, 66:13, 66:17
defense [3]-14:19, 44:20, 67:8
defenses [3] - 5:8,
5:10, 5:13
define $[1]$ - 20:7
defined ${ }_{[1]}$ - 53:21
defining [2]-9:19, 65:6
definition [1] - 33:3
defraud [1] - 72:12

## defrauded [1] - 42:22

 degree [2] - 24:8, 75:17denied [1] - 52:6
deny [2] - 4:16, 5:4
deployed [1] - 54:13
deponent [1] - 73:22
deposit [3] - 10:14, 10:15, 68:22
deposition [1] - 58:3 depositions [7] -
23:14, 62:17, 73:17, 73:18, 73:19, 73:20, 74:6
deposits [1] - 71:19 deprive [1] - 69:16 designate $[7]-7: 3$,
7:12, 13:21, 22:4, 29:10, 43:19, 73:21 designated [9] -
12:18, 13:3, 16:16, 23:2, 23:5, 34:23,
35:11, 43:17, 43:22
designating [1] - 6:23 designation [2]-29:9, 63:23
designations [2] -
35:12, 42:4
desire [1]-8:1
desk [2]-22:1, 22:10
detail [2]-25:17, 30:1
determine [1] - 64:9
develop [1] - 45:9
developed [2] - 50:23, 51:6
Dickinson [1] - 8:17
Dickinsons [1] - 51:25
Dicksons [5] - 42:13,
47:7, 47:8, 52:20,
53:17
Dicksons' [1] - 41:7
dictate [1] - 72:21
differ [1] - 28:18
difference [3]-43:4,
45:10, 53:19
differences [2] -
52:22, 75:2
different [17]-5:21,
7:23, 8:22, 9:19,
19:9, 23:23, 23:25,
43:2, 44:25, 47:14,
52:20, 62:9, 72:12, 74:5, 75:20
difficult [1] - 23:24
dig [1] - 55:18
diocese [3] - 40:14, 40:16, 40:17 direct [1] - 35:3
directed [1] - 32:12
direction [2]-21:17,

71:4
directly [2] - 14:10,
46:2
disagree [1] - 56:6
disagreement [2] -
20:11, 36:13
disagrees [1] - 34:1
disbursements [1] 71:19
discern [1] - 21:6
disclaimer [2]-41:13, 41:15
disclosed [1] - 65:16 disclosures [5] -
14:17, 67:4, 67:8, 67:9, 70:10
discoverable [2] -
71:11, 74:22
discovered [2] - 25:4, 69:9
discovering [1] - 51:2 discovery [49] - 5:14, 5:23, 6:8, 9:20, 12:9, $14: 15,14: 20,19: 3$, 20:4, 20:10, 20:11, 20:19, 21:22, 22:8, 22:24, 25:23, 27:11, 28:2, 28:6, 28:16,
29:18, 30:11, 47:4, 48:10, 48:12, 49:11, 50:12, 51:6, 52:8, 52:23, 53:15, 53:16, 61:17, 65:1, 65:2, 65:6, 65:11, 66:4, 67:11, 68:14, 68:15, 68:25, 69:21, 70:25, $72: 15,72: 16,73: 2$, 74:7
discovery's [1] - 21:16
discretion [2] - 15:8,
42:1
discuss [2] - 20:13, 72:25
discussed [3] - 35:14, 63:6, 70:21
discussion [2]-6:7, 70:21
discussions [1] - 19:5
disgruntled [1] - 51:9
dispositive [4] -
67:13, 67:14, 69:22, 69:23
dispute [5] - 22:8,
47:2, 57:11, 61:1, 72:1
disputes [2] - 19:3, 57:9
distinction [1] - 32:25
distributed [1] - 34:20
DISTRICT [2] - 1:1, 1:1

District [2] - 77:4, 77:5
ditch [1] - 9:3
diversions [2] - 64:23
diverted [1] - 16:18
DIVISION [1] - 1:2
docket [3] - $3: 5,7: 16$, 53:8
document [3]-33:7, 48:1, 70:9
documents [26] -
14:15, 19:16, 32:4,
32:5, 33:6, 33:10,
$33: 13,33: 15,35: 19$,
35:22, 36:14, 39:6,
41:10, 57:4, 57:23,
59:3, 61:18, 62:2,
63:8, 63:9, 63:10,
64:8, 64:13, 68:20,
68:24, 73:4
dol [1] $-41: 1$
dollar [3] - 17:25,
18:1, 54:18
dollar-fifty [1] - 18:1
dollars [10] - 9:24,
9:25, 10:4, 35:1,
35:2, 35:7, 41:1,
46:7, 46:8, 49:20
donate [1] - 18:18
donated [5] - 15:8,
42:2, 43:18, 43:23, 64:24
donation [6]-31:25,
32:22, 41:5, 43:13,
43:17, 43:22
donations [6] - 16:6,
22:21, 26:17, 33:4, 40:9, 61:13
done [18] - 17:24,
18:15, 25:23, 37:13,
37:18, $38: 3,45: 18$,
45:19, 45:20, 53:8,
55:12, 57:16, 58:21,
58:23, 58:24, 59:12,
60:5, 60:8
donkey [2] - 54:16
donor [8] - 32:2, 35:9,
43:6, 44:1, 45:3,
45:12, 62:3, 62:12
donor-specific [1] -
62:3
donors [21]-3:21,
12:1, 12:6, 32:7,
32:10, 32:19, 33:19,
36:4, 36:9, 40:4,
40:19, 44:8, 46:13,
48:17, 50:9, 57:12,
62:10, 62:13, 62:16,
65:14
down [8]-9:11, 31:11,
34:19, 43:1, 53:13,

62:17, 65:23, 66:24
Dr [2] - 14:1, 26:22
dramatically [1] -
28:18
drawing [2] - 32:25,
33:21
driving [1] - 60:20
due [1] - 66:13
dug [1] - 12:6
during [1] - 47:9
duty [2]-26:15, 26:16
$E$
e-mail [1] - 64:5
early [4]-14:14,
39:25, 67:22, 70:17
earnest [1] - 76:12
earthquake [2] -
17:20, 18:11
easiest [1] - 56:9
East [1] - 1:24
Eastern [2]-26:9,
26:11
easy $[8]-12: 2,22: 22$,
24:9, 29:19, 29:21,
54:11, 54:20
eats [1] - 38:17
ecclesiastical [1] -
51:8
ECFA [35] - 13:16,
13:19, 14:12, 27:1,
27:9, 29:24, 31:3,
31:14, 31:19, 31:20,
34:2, 34:9, 42:8,
48:16, 48:18, 48:19,
48:21, 49:4, 49:7,
49:9, 49:12, 49:15,
49:18, 50:11, 50:15,
50:19, 50:25, 51:3,
51:17, 51:19, 61:10
edges [1] - 20:7
educating [1] - 18:15
educational [1] -
10:12
effect [3]-50:9,
55:14, 71:18
effectively [2] - 8:10,
67:9
efficiencies [2] - 28:8,
65:9
efficient [1] - 55:23
effort [1] - 20:16
efforts [1] - 13:14
Eighth [4] - 8:19, 52:7,
52:10, 53:7
either [6]-7:16, 10:5,
21:2, 23:17, 54:7
elaborate [1] - 31:12
Ellan [1]-2:18

| embarrass [1] - 74:4 | 40:7, 40:20, 50:11, | 17:20, 30:25, 33:14, | final [3] - 10:24, 29:1, | 47:13, 47:18, 48:4, |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| EMERICK [1] - 1:9 | 61:10, 61:11, 61:15, | 34:7, 35:11, 40:23 | 29:1 | 8:5, 64:22 |
| empire [2]-10:12, | 71:3, 71:2 | 41:16, 41:17, 49:10, | finances [1] - 71:19 | fraudulent [1] - 4:12 |
| 19 | evident ${ }_{[1]}-5: 16$ | 50: | financial [1]-56:24 | free [3]-7:24, 7:25, |
| empirically | ex [2] - 51:16, 53:2 | facto [1] - 71:18 | findings [4]-34:1, | 9:13 |
| 54:20, 55:1, 55:23 | ex-employees [2] | facts [8] - 4:21, 5:12 | 4:6, 50:6, 51 | fruit ${ }_{[1]}-75: 5$ |
| employ [1] - 55:17 | 51:16, 53:24 | 50:19, 51:20, 51:23, | fine [6] - 7:13, 9:11 | fulfill $\left.{ }^{2}\right]$ - 32:2, 35:8 |
| employees [5] - 42:14, | exact [1] - 14:4 | :24, 52:19, 72:10 | 19:9, 30:17, 67:20, | fulfilled [3] - 32:13, |
| 51:9, 51:16, 52:3, | exactly [11]-7:22 | fails [2] - 5:6, 75:4 | 68:5 | 45:21, 45:24 |
| 53:24 | 12:6, 13:21, 23:1 | failure [1]-22: | fingers [1] - 57:5 | fully [3] - 59:17, 71:22, |
| employment [2] - | 43:17, 43:22, 55:7, | fair [1]-71:20 | firm [6] - 8:21, 25:3, | 75:3 |
| 52:4, 53:25 | 2, 56:10, 58:13, | fairly [1] - 9:9 | 25:10, 25:11, 25:12, | funded [1] - 40:3 |
| encourage [2]-21:11, | 58:17 | faith [1] - 20:16 | 27:5 | fundraising [2]-4:1 |
| 29:24 | examine ${ }_{[1]}-63: 20$ | family [2] - 4:5, 51:15 | Firm [1]-2:3 | 25:24 |
| end [2] - 56:24, 68:14 | example [7]-34:25, | $\operatorname{far}[3]-17: 5,19: 16$ | first [15]-10:1, 12:13, | funds [10]-15:9, |
| ending $[1]-36: 14$ <br> ends [5]-20:9, 46:7, | $40: 11,40: 24,42: 13$, $48: 12,49: 17,63: 21$ | fashion [1]-21:1 |  | 37:22, 42: |
| 46:8, 49:24, $65: 7$ | except ${ }^{11}$ - 36:21 | favor [2]-17:25, 18:2 | 9:23, 47:19, 52:17, | 45:22, 52:24, 57:12 |
| enlightening [1] - 54:2 | exception [1]-40:8 | Fax [4]-2:5, 2:10 | 5:21, 67:18, 75:5, | fungible [1] - 45:25 |
| enrichment [2]-5:2, | exceptions [1] - 45:6 | 6, 2:20 | $5: 8$ | future [1]-53:12 |
| 47:13 | exchange [2] - 16:5, | FAYETTEVILLE [2] | fiscal [1] - 50:23 | fuzzy [1] - 20:7 |
| Enron [1] - 11:14 | 70:9 | $1: 2,1: 15$ | five [2]-63:23, 69:3 |  |
| entered [1] - 6:22 <br> enterprise [1] - 18:9 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { excuse [2] - 41:7, } \\ & 69: 19 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Fayetteville }[3]-1: 25, \\ & 2: 4,39: 9 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { focus [1] - 21:21 } \\ & \text { focused }[1]-4: 2 \end{aligned}$ | G |
| enterprises [1] - 10:10 | executive [2] - 22:4, | FC-4s [1] - 26:16 | folks [2]-11:11, 48:24 | GAAP [7] - $37: 18$, |
| entertain [1] - 74:2 | 22:5 | FC-6 [1] - 37:23 | follow [2]-15:24, 24:9 | 38:2, 49:23, 58:11, |
| entirely [3]-12:13, | exhibit [1] - 14:2 | FC-6s [1]-26:16 | followed [2]-32:17, | 58:16, 58:21, 60:6 |
| 40:3, 43:16 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Exhibit [6] - 15:1, } \\ & \text { 15:2, 29:25, 47:23 } \end{aligned}$ | February ${ }^{[1]}-47: 8$ | 67:12 | gained [2]-28:8, 65:9 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { entities [33] - 3:4, } \\ & 3: 23,11: 13,11: 16, \end{aligned}$ | $15: 2,29: 25,47: 2$ 47:25 | federal $[1]-15: 18$ Federal [3]-1:24, | follows [1] - 51:13 <br> foot ${ }_{[1]}-60: 19$ | garbage [1] - 59:4 |
| $3: 23,11: 13,11: 16$, $16: 25,23: 25,24: 25$, | exhibits [1] - 47:23 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Federal [3]-1:24, } \\ 77: 3,77: 17 \end{gathered}$ | $\operatorname{FOR}_{[4]}-1: 7,1: 7,2: 2,$ | GARLAND ${ }_{[1]}-1: 2$ |
| 36:24, 37:1, 37:8, | exist [1] - 71:3 | fertile [1] - 73:25 | 2:12 | Garland [1] - 3:1 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 37: 9,37: 18,38: 3, \\ & 39: 20,40: 5,40: 10, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { exists }[2]-27: 18 \text {, } \\ & 27: 19 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { feud }[1]-51: 15 \\ & \text { few }[3]-12: 12, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { for-profit }[9] \text { - 10:10, } \\ 16: 19,16: 21,16: 24, \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Garvey }[4]-25: 3, \\ 25: 9,27: 3,60: 23 \end{gathered}$ |
| 57:2, 57:3, 57:14, | expected [1] - 46:13 | 63:5 | 18:1, 18:5, 18:18, | geared [2]-4:1, 30:9 |
| 57:22, 58:15, 58:22, | expenses [1]-13:22 | fiduciaries [1] - 12:11 | 39:20 | general [6]-20:12, |
| 59:3, 59:23, 59:25, | experience [1]-22:11 | field ${ }_{[13]}-10: 9,12: 17$, | foregoing [1] - 77:7 | 44:22, 45:2, 45:3, |
| 60:3, 60:4, 61:13, | expert [5] - 29:10, | 7:2, | foreign [2]-26:17, | 45:5, 74:7 |
| 61:15, 64:24, 71:12, | 67:7, 67:21, 67:23, | 17:8, 31:10, 32:1 | 5 | generally [4]-6:1, |
| 71:13, 71:20 | 68 | 32:2, 32:23, 33 | forensic [3]-17:4, | 66:6, 67:25, 71:5 |
| entitled [1] - 77:9 | experts [1] - 29:10 | fifty [1] - 18: | 55:17, 71:8 | germane [1]-69:18 |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { entity }[12]-3: 24,25: 2, \\ 26: 13,27: 12,27: 14, \end{gathered}$ | expired [1] - 7:19 <br> exposures [1] - 73:7 | fight [1] - 60:22 <br> fighting $[1]$ - 65 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { forensically }[2]-23: 3, \\ & 24: 6 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Germany [2] - 11:16, } \\ & 27: 22 \end{aligned}$ |
| 27:15, 27:20, 33:1, | express [1] - 74:10 | figure [6] - 10:5 | formally [2]-27:20, | GFA [44] - 15:7, 23:18, |
| 71:7, 73:20 | Expressway [1]-2:8 | $25: 20,25: 22,26: 19,$ | 27:24 | 31:21, 32:1, 32:8, |
| enunciated $[1]$ - 62: envision [1] - 73:7 | extent [10] - 15: | $56: 11,67:$ | $\text { tt }[1]-77: 10$ | 2:14, 32:21, 32:23, |
| envisions [1] - 65:10 | $65: 3,67: 14,71: 11,$ | $25: 21,26: 16,29: 1,$ | former [1] - 42:14 | $3: 1,33: 3,33: 9$ |
| essence [1] - 4:9 | $72: 11,73: 11,73: 21$ | 29:4, 29:6, 29:8, | forms [2]-4:22, 4:25 | 3:17, 33:18, 33:19, |
| essentially [2] - 7:14, 64:4 | $\text { eyes }[3]-6: 25,8: 7 \text {, }$ 8:25 | $29: 12,29: 14,55: 21,$ | forth [4]-40:10, | $3: 20,33: 24,35: 2,$ <br> 5:3, 35:6, 36:25, |
| establish [1] - 73:25 |  | 66:15, 67:4, 67:22 | 56:18, 56:25, 58:12 | $\begin{aligned} & 5: 3,35: 6,36: 25, \\ & 7: 13,37: 17,37: 25, \end{aligned}$ |
| established [2]-43:3 | F | $7: 8,66: 2$ | founding [1] - 48:1 | $1,40: 13,42: 1$ |
| estate [1]-39:1 |  | 66:23, 67:2 | four [7]-36:20, 47:6, | 3:15, 43:18, 43:23, <br> $4 \cdot 9,49: 3,50: 17$ |
| et $[1]$ - 19:23 <br> evangelical $[1]-18: 13$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { F-6 }[1]-63: 23 \\ & \text { face }[2]-59: 7, \end{aligned}$ | files [2] - 56:23, 57:23 filing [8]-20:19, | $47: 11,47: 12,47: 15$ $56: 18,72: 24$ | $\begin{aligned} & 44: 9,49: 3,50: 17, \\ & 51: 7,51: 16,58: 18, \end{aligned}$ |
| evangelists [1] - 38:22 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { tace }[2]-59: /, \\ & \text { facie }[1]-22: 23 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { filing [8]-20:19, } \\ & 25: 20,28: 24,50: 14, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 56: 18,72: 24 \\ \text { frame }[1]-65: 25 \end{gathered}$ | $58: 22,63: 17,64: 2$ |
| eventually [1]-17:8 | facilities [1]-10:12 | 66:9, 66:12, 66:14, | frames [1] - 5:25 | GFA's [4]-17:5, |
| everywhere [1] - 24:4 | facing $[1]$ - 30:2 | 66:16 | fraud [11] - 4:22, 4:23, | 31:23, 31:24, 32:1 <br> GFA-Canada [1] - |
| evidence [9]-39:17, | fact [12]-15:22, 17:7, | filings [1] - 56:24 | $4: 25,10: 8,45: 8 \text {, }$ | GFA-Canada [1] - |


| 33:19 | 51:14, 64:8 | :17 | 6:10, 49:7, | 72:14 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| GFA-India [ | Group [1]-2:8 | holiday [1] - 29:7 | 54:2 | informed [2] - 31:19 |
| 31:21, 32:8, 32 | guarantee $[4]-12: 16$, $12 \cdot 22,13 \cdot 11,15 \cdot 15$ | Holmes [2]-52:6 | impression [2] | 31:21 |
| $33: 1,35: 2,35: 3,$ |  | 52:11 honest $[1]-16: 13$ | improperly [1]-25:7 | $70: 10,73: 6$ |
| :6, 36:25, 63:17 |  | Hong [3] - 10:15 | in/garbage [1] - 59:5 | nk [1] - 46:6 |
| 64:2 | guess [3] - 26:3, | 23:17, |  |  |
| GFA-India's [2] -$\begin{aligned} & 33: 18,37: 25 \\ & \text { GFA-USA [4] - 37:13, } \\ & 37: 17,38: 1,58: 22 \\ & \text { gift }[1]-31: 21 \end{aligned}$ | :10, 39:20 |  | $34: 16$ <br> Inc [6] - 3:3, 10:19, | $29: 4$ <br> instances [1] - 39:13 |
|  | guidance [4]-21:6 |  |  |  |
|  | $36: 18,56: 22,64: 1$ | $\begin{aligned} & 9: 4,9: 17,30: 12, \\ & 30: 19,31: 13,32: 4, \\ & 33: 12,34: 6,34: 18, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Inc [6] - 3:3, 10:19, } \\ & \text { 19:11, 19:17, } 33: 2, \\ & 33: 4 \end{aligned}$ | instances [1] - 39:13 <br> institutions [1]-16:19 <br> insufficient ${ }^{11]}$ - 73:11 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 34: | INC ${ }_{[1]}-1: 7$ include ${ }^{\text {[1] }}$ - 4:22 | insufficient $[1]-73: 11$ <br> intend ${ }^{[1]}$ - 35:20 <br> intended [2]-31:10, |
| gifts [7] - 15:11 |  | $\begin{aligned} & 39: 5, \\ & 40 \cdot 2, \end{aligned}$ | include [1]-4:22 included [2]-16:6, 63:17 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { intended }[2]-31: 10, \\ & 33: 4 \end{aligned}$ |
| 32:1, 32:23, 42:3 | hair ${ }_{[1]}-54: 7$ | , |  | intent [1] - 35:18 |
| GISELA [1] - 1:8 | half [3]-17:21, 34 | 6:20, 47:2, 48:9, | $\begin{gathered} \text { including }[5]-4: 23, \\ 4: 24,5: 9,10: 25 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { intentions [2] - 4:18, } \\ & \text { 17:16 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 12, | handed [1]-27: | 5, 53:6, 56:13, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { income }[5]-15: 6, \\ & 38: 14,38: 15,38: 19 \\ & 41: 24 \end{aligned}$ | interested [1] - 17:12 <br> interesting [2] - 17:13, |
| $\begin{aligned} & 36: 7,38: 3,38: 5, \\ & 40: 19,41: 1,42 \end{aligned}$ | handle [5] - 19:3 | $: 16,57: 19,58: 1$ |  |  |
| $44: 25,45: 4,45: 2$ | 44:25 | $67: 20,68: 5,68: 18,$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { incorrect }[2]-33: 9, \\ & 37: 23 \end{aligned}$ | 61:3 |
| :2, 53 | hands [1] - 76:15 | 69:19, 70:5, 70:12 |  | ```interlocutory [1] - 52:7``` |
| 58:22, 59:14, 66:1 | ging $[1]$ - 75 | 1:22, 72:7, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { independent }[3]- \\ & 13: 17,55: 4,55: 11 \end{aligned}$ | internal $[1]-32: 14$ international [1] -$27: 13$ |
| glad [1] - 47 | happy [1] - 75:23 | HONORABLE ${ }_{[1]}$ |  |  |
| glaring [1] - 52: | ass [1] - 74: | 1:1 | India [33]-4:2, 10:14, |  |
| glaringly ${ }_{[1]}$ - 38:11 <br> goal [2]-12:24 6 | hard [3]-10:5, 12:9 | Hope [3] - 11:1 | $\begin{aligned} & 11: 10,17: 22,23: 25, \\ & 25: 12,26: 7,26: 16, \end{aligned}$ | INTERNATIONAL [1] - |
| goods [4] - 16:4, |  |  | 25:12, 26:7, 26:16, | 1:7 |
| 41:16, 41:18, 41:1 | 76:1 | 14, 18:17, | $32: 11,32: 12,32: 13$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { interrogatories [2] - } \\ & 73: 3,73: 10 \end{aligned}$ |
| GOSPEL [2] - 1:7 | Harriet [2]-2:18, 3:13 | 19:19, 40:8, | $\begin{aligned} & 32: 14,33: 1,35: 2, \\ & 35: 3,35: 6,36: 24 \end{aligned}$ | $\text { invest }[1]-17: 25$ |
| Gospel [37] - 3:3, | hat [1]-61: | 40:10, 42: |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { involved }[3]-5: 25, \\ & 22: 2,51: 18 \end{aligned}$ |
| 3:22, 3:23, 4:4 | Ha | hospitals [1] - 10:1 | $\begin{aligned} & 35: 3,35: 6,36: 24, \\ & 36: 25,37: 10,38: 16, \end{aligned}$ |  |
| 10:18, 11:9, 11:12 |  | 57 | $\begin{aligned} & 36: 25,37: 10,38: 16 \\ & 39: 20,40: 3,40: 14 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { 22:2, 51:18 } \\ \text { involves }[1]-6: 20 \end{gathered}$ |
| 3, 12:5, 14:1 | - 5 | house [1] - 38:17 | 44:8, 45:22, 57:1, | involving ${ }_{[1]}$ - 64:23 |
| 15:5, 19:11, 19:1 |  | Housekeeping |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { IRS [3] - 15:23, 26:4, } \\ & 41: 13 \end{aligned}$ |
| 23:16, 23:22, 25:11 | hear [4]-21:23 |  |  |  |
| 27:13, 27:21, 33:1, | :6, 59 | 1:1 | 37:25 | IRS-required [1] - |
| 34:1, 41:22, 41:24, 48:15, 48:18, 48:19, | heard [3]- $37: 21,47$ | huge $[2]-64: 1$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Indian }[14]-23: 21, \\ & 26: 13,37: 18,37: 24, \end{aligned}$ | IRS-required [1] - $41: 13$ |
| $50: 2,50: 7,56: 25,$ |  |  | $57: 3,57: 14,58: 6$ | issue [15] - 7:19, $8: 6$, |
| 57:13, 59:20, 59:21, | :9, |  | 57:3, 57:14, 58:6, <br> 59:3, 59:22, 59:25, | $35: 15,36: 10,36: 16,$ |
| 61:3, 61:7, 71:6, |  | hundreds [1]-54:18 | 59:3, 59:22, 59:25, | $\begin{aligned} & 44: 17,45: 1,50: 2, \\ & 50: 25,57: 10,62: 4, \end{aligned}$ |
| 71:11 |  | hurt [1] - 49:8 | 60.9 - |  |
| governance [1] | 1] - 34:2 |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { indicated }[3]-12: 20, \\ & 41: 25,53: 9 \end{aligned}$ | 65:12 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { government [2] } \\ \text { 10:25, } 23: 21 \end{gathered}$ | [1] - 71:2 | idea [6]-20:1, 40:2 | $\begin{gathered} \text { individual }[4]-36: 8, \\ 52: 19,71: 12,73: 19 \end{gathered}$ | 21:6, 28:1, 29:16, |
| Government [1] - 16:8 |  | 50:8, 54:7, 64:6 | Individually $[1]$ - 1:3 | $50: 22,51: 10,51: 18$ |
| governmental [1] 27:20 | 13:11, 13:22, | ideas [1] - 5:21 <br> identical [2]-53 | individually [2]-3:2, | $\begin{aligned} & 51: 23,63: 19,64: 16, \\ & 69: 24,70: 7,75: 25 \end{aligned}$ |
|  |  |  | individuals [3] - 3: | $\begin{aligned} & \text { items }[4]-34: 23, \\ & 48: 24,49: 1,56: 18 \\ & \text { itself }[1]-49: 1 \end{aligned}$ |
| granted [1] - 5: |  | identified [1] - 16:20 |  |  |
| graves [1] - 3:10 |  | identi | inform [1] - 68:25 <br> informally [1] - 9:10 |  |
| Graves [1] - 2:3 |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { III [4] - 1:2, 3:2, 46:15, } \\ & 46: 19 \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { great }[8]-18: 15,19 \\ 23: 2,25: 1,54: 10, \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 6:21, 6:24, 25:16, } \\ & \text { 29:20, 29:21, 33:22, } \\ & 36: 7,36: 9,47: 21, \\ & 48: 6,55: 4,55: 6, \\ & 59: 6,59: 20,62: 2, \end{aligned}$ | J |
| 6.4, |  | $\underset{43.25}{\text { imagination }[1] ~-~}$ <br> imperative ${ }_{[1]}-75: 25$ <br> implicate [1]-47:13 <br> important [5] - 9:19, |  | 2] - 2:3 |
| ground [3] - 30:20 |  |  |  | Jan [1]-41:23 |
| 73:25 |  |  |  | nuary [7] - 29:13 |
| group [3]-9:14, |  |  |  | 41:8, 41:23, 66:10 |


| 66:22, 67:3 | 37:16, 44:13, 58:19, | local ${ }_{[1]}-75: 24$ | mean [28]-5:14, 12:3, | minute [1] - 56:17 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Jesus [6]-9:25, 10:1, | 60:22 | locate [1] - 44: | 5:13, 20:21, 28:13, | isappropriated |
| 10:4, 35:1, 54:17 | lat | locations [1] - 38: | 3:13, 33:14, 34:1 |  |
| 64:1 | laundry [1] - 48:2 | Locke [1]-2:18 | 7:21, 40:24 | misdirected [1] |
| jgraves | Law [2]-2:3, 2:8 | locked [1] - 7:20 | 1:9, 42:12, 42:23 | 43:18 |
| bassettlawfirm <br> com [1]-2:6 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { law }[3]-4: 23,8: 3 \text {, } \\ & 15: 7 \end{aligned}$ | look [11] - 9:3, 21:17, | $\begin{aligned} & 43: 1,45: 7,45: 25, \\ & 46: 5,50: 20,52: 19 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { misinterpretation }[1] \text { - } \\ & 33: 12 \end{aligned}$ |
| John [2] - 39:10 | law | 3:24, 55:5, 55:12 | :21, 53:24, 58:8, | misrepresent [1] |
| 39:1 | lawsuit [3] - 47:7 | 56:16, 62:18, 64 | , 59:1, 59:10 | 17 |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { joint }[4]-3: 17,3: 19, \\ 20: 24,27: 21 \end{gathered}$ | 47:8, $64: 1$ lawyer [2] - | $\begin{array}{r} \text { looked }[4]-48: 21, \\ 50: 15,50: 16,52 \end{array}$ | $74: 12,75: 2$ <br> meaningful | $\begin{gathered} \text { missing [3] - 17:5, } \\ 31: 5,38: 11 \end{gathered}$ |
| judge [1] - 21:24 | $54: 10$ | looking [8] - 14:25 | 22:17, 74:1 | mission [2] - 4:18 |
| Judge [4] - 22:2, 52:6, 52:11, 55:9 | lawyers [3]-9:12 $19: 9,75: 1$ | $40: 25,41: 6,47: 20$ <br> $52 \cdot 13,53 \cdot 5,69 \cdot 1$ | mechanical $[1]$ - 73:1 <br> media [1] - 10:12 | 18:13 |
| $52: 11,55: 9$ | $19: 9,75: 1$ | $52: 13,53: 5,69: 1,$ | media [1] - 10:12 | missions [2]-3:25, |
| Judicial [1] - 77:11 | least [5] - 23:25 | loose [2] - 27:8, 49:24 | $70: 21,70: 24$ | misspoke |
| judicious [1] - 73:13 | 50:12, 66:6, 68: | Lord [1]-2:18 | mediator [2]-70:18, | misstated [1] - 30: |
| July [1] - 29:5 | 76:9 | Lord's [1] - 13:2 | 70:20 | mistaken [1] - 70:3 |
| jump [1] - 9:3 | leave [6]-29:14, 69:9, | lose [3] - 12:1, 12:8, | medical ${ }^{[2]}$ - 40:9, $42: 17$ | modest [1] - 38:17 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { jury [3] - 14:7, 15:13, } \\ & 17: 17 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 69:10, 69:12, 72:25, } \\ & 73: 12 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 54: 24 \\ \text { lost }[1]-18: \end{gathered}$ | $\text { meet }[4]-20: 13,22 \text { : }$ | moment [1] - 5:3 |
|  |  | low [1] - 75:5 | 25:5, 76:9 | money [73] - 3:2 |
| K | $\begin{gathered} \text { ledger }_{[3]}-54: 15 \\ 54: 16,54: 18 \end{gathered}$ | low-hanging ${ }_{[1]}$ - 75:5 | meetings [1] - 48:25 member [3]-43:14, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 10:3, 10:9, 10:10, } \\ & \text { 11:17, 12:2, 12:5, } \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { K.P }[6]-1: 7,10: 18, \\ & \text { 11:7, 19:13, 19:19, } \\ & 24: 2 \end{aligned}$ | legal [1] - 45:9 | M | $48: 19,53: 21$ | $\begin{aligned} & 12: 11,12: 17,12: 24, \\ & 13: 2,14: 10,15: 21, \end{aligned}$ |
|  | less [1]-44:17 letter [11]-20:21, | $\text { M. }{ }_{[1]}-1: 2$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { members [6] - 4:5, } \\ 4: 7,22: 4,22: 21, \end{gathered}$ |  |
| $\text { keep }_{[1]}-29: 5$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { letter [11]-20:21, } \\ & 20: 24,29: 24,31: 14, \end{aligned}$ | M4 [2] - 42:5, 42:6 machine [1]-1:22 | $\begin{gathered} \text { 53:17, 53:22 } \\ \text { mention [1]-26:25 } \end{gathered}$ |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { kids [1] - 18:15 } \\ & \text { kind }[21]-6: 7,12: 9, \end{aligned}$ | 31:18, 32:25, 49:1, 49:13, 49:15, 51:19, | machine ${ }_{[1]}-1: 22$ | mention [1]-26:25 <br> mentioned [6] - 4:22, |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 12:21, 20:24, 21:5, } \\ & 21: 19,24: 4,26: 23, \end{aligned}$ | $63: 1$ | Magistrate [1]-22:2 <br> mail [1] - 64:5 | mentioned [6] - 4:22, 11:24, 36:6, 36:22, | 23:4, 23:16, 23:20, 24:1, 24:2, 24:5, |
| $\begin{aligned} & 27: 19, \angle 4: 4, \angle 0: 2 \\ & 30: 9,38: 20,50: 3 \end{aligned}$ | lev | main [1]-29:16 | 37:11, 41:14 | $24: 10,24: 14,24: 15$ |
| 54:3, 58:25, 59:4, | le |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { merits }[8]-5: 23,20: 8, \\ 35: 22,35: 23,44: 17, \end{gathered}$ | 24:18, 26:22, 29:23,$31: 4,32: 8,32: 11$, |
| 17, 65:22, 66:21 | liberal [1] - 48: | major [3] - 61:16 | 35:22, 35:23, 44:17, <br> 65:1, 65:3, 65:11 |  |
| 71:16, 72:9, 74:19, | life [1] - 38:23 | $\begin{aligned} & 65: 23,71: 25 \\ & \text { majority }[1]-14: 8 \\ & \text { management }[6]-3: 8, \end{aligned}$ | 65:1, 65:3, 65:11 <br> Messrs [3]-2:3, 2:7, | 31:4, 32:8, 32:11, 32:12, 32:14, 33:13, |
| 75:17 | likely [2]-20 |  | 2:17 | $33: 18,34: 17,34: 19,$ |
| kingpin [1] - 10:17 | 71:20 |  | met [1] - 70:23 | 35:5, 35:6, 39:22, |
| knowing [2] - 17:12, | likewise ${ }_{[1]}-7: 25$ | $\begin{aligned} & 36: 6,36: 19,56: 17, \\ & 68: 7 \end{aligned}$ | Metropolitan [1] -37:2 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 42:15, 44:23, 44:24, } \\ & \text { 45:4, 45:7, 45:11, } \end{aligned}$ |
|  | limit [1]-29:3 |  |  |  |
| knowledge [2] $27: 15,71: 2$ | limitations [9]-5:9, | MANAGEMENT ${ }_{[1]}$ 1:12 | $\begin{gathered} \text { metropolitan [6] - } \\ \text { 10:19, 10:20, 10:23, } \\ \text { 19:13, 26:15, 37:1 } \end{gathered}$ | 45:21, 45:23, 45:25, $46: 3,49: 17,54: 13$ |
| known [2] - 8:4, 43:21 | 47:15, 48:8 | managing ${ }_{[1]}-11: 1$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 55: 7,55: 13,56: 9 \\ & 57: 13,57: 14,64: 24 \end{aligned}$ |
| knows [3]-18:6, | 71:1, $73:$ | manner [1] - 45:18 | $\text { 19:13, 26:15, } 37: 1$ |  |
| 22:18, 37:22 | line $[6]-6: 8,11:$ | Marc [2]-2:7, 3:10 marcstanley@mac. com [1]-2:10 | ```Miers [3]-2:18, 3:13, 19:7 might [10]-5:13, 18:6,``` |  |
| Kong [3] - 10:15, 23:17, 35:4 | $31: 2,32: 16,32: 17$ $59: 13$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { money's [3] - 17:5, } \\ & 17: 22,29: 22 \end{aligned}$ |
|  | 59:13 lined $21-17 \cdot 9,55 \cdot 25$ |  |  |  |
| L | $\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{d}_{[2]}-17: 9,55: 25 \\ & \mathbf{g}[2]-31: 5,49: 20 \end{aligned}$ | rketing $[1]-48$ <br> rtin [2]-2:7, 3: | 27:7, 50:4, 55:22, 61:4, 61:7, 68:24, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { monies [19]-4:17, } \\ & 11: 25,16: 16,33: 17, \end{aligned}$ |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { list }[4]-48: 24,56: 25, \\ & 63: 12,63: 18 \end{aligned}$ | master [3]-55:15, | $68: 25,76: 13$ million [9] - 10:14, | $\begin{aligned} & 34: 15,34: 22,35: 7 \\ & 35: 11,37: 24,37: 25, \end{aligned}$ |
| language [8]-12:20, | 63:12, 63:18 | $\begin{gathered} \text { 55:22, } 56: 11 \\ \text { materials }[2]-3: 20, \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { million }[9]-10: 14, \\ & \text { 10:15, } 31: 7,31: 17, \end{aligned}$ | 38:3, 38:8, 40:19, |
| 13:7, 13:10, 14:5, | lite |  | $31: 22,32: 6,32: 7,$ | 40:22, 43:3, 45:23, |
| 41:4, 41:12, 42:7, | litigate [1] - 5:17 | Matt [2]-2:18, 3:14 matter [10]-3:1, 3:4, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 32:18, 33:16 } \\ & \text { millions [1] - 49:20 } \end{aligned}$ | month [1] - 63:5 |
| 42:8 | litigation [1] - 76:12 |  |  |  |
| lanka [1] - 11:18 | $\text { live }[1]-69: 3$ | 3:7, 6:11, 8:18, | mind [3]-24:13, | months [1] - 69:3 |
| large [4] - $9: 14,11: 3$, $34: 14,49: 17$ | living [1] - 38:2 | 17:11, 17:15, 21:8, | 25:23, 43:24 | most [10]-23:10, 30:25, 34:4, 36:12 |
| $34: 14,49: 17$ | $\operatorname{LLC}_{[3]}-11: 12,11: 13$ | 67:16, 77:9 | mine [1] - 16:3 | 30:25, 34:4, 36:12, <br> 36:14, 36:20, 47:16, <br> 52:20, 55:22, 56:19 |
| Last [1] - 57:1 <br> last [6] - 8:17, 37:13, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { LLP [2] - 2:14, 2:18 } \\ & \text { loan [1] - 40:3 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { matters [2]-8:3, } \\ & 52: 14 \end{aligned}$ | Ministries [1] - 57:1 |  |




23:13, 24:3, 25:22,
26:24, 27:16, 29:17,
30:1, 34:8, 36:16,
49:15, 53:6, 55:23,
56:15, 62:4, 62:16,
62:18, 63:20, 69:1,
72:9, 74:3, 75:18, 76:17
Realtime ${ }_{[1]}-77: 3$
realtime $[1]-1: 22$
reason [4]-8:2, 53:23, 65:17, 69:18 reasonable [3] 15:13, 48:9, 75:2
reasons [6]-34:18, 36:1, 42:10, 42:12, 42:18, 43:2
rebuttal [2]-29:11, 68:2
receipt $[3]$ - 13:8, 14:1, 26:17
receive $[2]$ - 41:16, 41:18
received [6] - 12:24,
13:10, 31:25, 32:22,
63:12, 74:16
receives [4]-38:14,
38:15, 38:18, 38:19
receiving ${ }_{[1]}-24: 1$
recipient [1]-24:11
recite [1]-5:3
recognize [1]-8:17
recognized [1]-27:20
record ${ }_{[1]}$ - 7:21
recorded [1] - 1:22
records [7]-12:10,
27:4, 37:3, 40:25,
41:7, 41:8, 61:5
redirect ${ }_{[1]}-12: 25$
redirected [1]-31:9
reference [1]-70:15
referring [1]-13:25
reflected ${ }_{[1]}$ - 16:3
reflecting ${ }_{[1]}-26: 17$
regard [5] - 28:19,
70:25, 72:8, 73:1, 74:7
regardless [1] - 61:2
regular [2]-22:6, 22:7
regularly [4]-24:25,
50:17, 51:11, 51:13
regulations [1] - 77:10
related [2]-3:23, 25:7
relates [2]-47:2,
73:17
relating [2]-31:25,
32:22
relatively $[1]$ - 60:24
relevance [1] - 75:13
relevant [2]-64:9,

75:15
relief $[3]-5: 6,17: 20$,
18:11
religious [2]-25:24, 49:5
remains [1]-7:20
replenish [1]-32:14
reply $[4]-28: 25,29: 8$, 53:9, 66:16 report [12]-3:17, 3:19, 6:9, 25:18, 31:4, 34:2, 34:7, 37:23, 37:24, 56:18, 61:10, 63:23
report's [1]-33:20
reported ${ }_{[1]}$ - 77:8
Reporter [3]-1:24, 77:4, 77:17
REPORTER [1] - 77:1
reports [3]-37:23,
38:2, 58:5
represent $[1]-61: 7$
representations [4] -
4:13, 12:15, 14:8, 43:16
represented [2] 27:18, 38:9
representing ${ }_{[2]}$ 19:11, 50:9
represents [1]-61:8 request $[3]-35: 8$, 45:21, 73:12
requested [6] - 37:17, 38:2, 58:21, 59:12, 59:20, 60:5
requests [4]-32:13, 32:14, 45:24, 73:16 require $[3]-21: 9$, 22:3, 26:5
required [13]-15:18, 15:20, 16:8, 20:13, 22:1, 25:8, 25:17, 41:13, 41:15, 50:10, 65:2, 68:8
requirement ${ }_{[1]}$ 41:20
requirements [1] 26:18
residence [1] - 38:17
residences [1] - 38:12
resolve [5]-17:10,
20:4, 21:7, 22:8, 66:5
resolved [1]-7:19
resoundingly ${ }_{[1]}$ 25:14
respect [10] - 4:11,
35:17, 36:8, 36:9,
36:12, 37:8, 47:3,
47:17, 52:19, 52:25
respond $_{[1]}-54: 5$
response $[5]-28: 25$,
$29: 6,53: 4,66: 13$,
$66: 17$
responses $[1]-52: 17$
responsibility ${ }_{[1]}-4: 6$
restricted [2] - 32:1,
32:23
restrictions [2]-32:3,
71:1
returns [1] - 38:13
review [1]-3:20
reviewed [3]-3:16, 33:22, 64:18
RICO [5] - 4:25, 10:7,
10:17, 22:24, 47:12
rigorous [1] - 65:4
rmowrey@lockelord.
com [1]-2:21
RMR [2] - 1:23, 77:17
Rob [1] - 54:9
Robert [2]-2:17, 3:14
Rock [1] - 2:15
room [1] - 76:9
roomful [1] - 74:25
Ross [1] - 2:19
roughly ${ }^{[1]}$ - 62:16
rub [4]-37:10, 55:23,
56:21, 56:22
rubber [5] - 16:20,
19:19, 39:24, 40:2
rule [1] - 48:12
Rule [3]-3:8, 3:17, 5:20
rules [2]-23:13, 61:17
rulings [1] - 60:14
run [2]-9:2, 19:17

| $\mathbf{S}$ |
| :--- |
| sake $[1]-72: 18$ <br> sale $[1]-50: 5$ <br> sat$[1]-35: 6$ |

sat ${ }_{[1]}$ - 35:6
satisfaction [1] - 74:1
satisfy [2] - 57:17,
58:24
satisfying [1] - $38: 7$
save ${ }_{[1]}-55: 12$
saw [3]-13:7, 53:7,
71:15
scanning [1]-8:14
scattered [1] - 33:21
schedule [2]-28:23,
53:15
scheduling [2]-
20:12, 65:10
scheme [2]-72:11,
72:12
school [2] - 16:21,

18:16
Schuster [2]-2:17,
3:14
SCHUSTER [1] -
31:15
scope [2] - 60:13, 72:8
screwed [1] - 23:7
seal $[3]-8: 3,27: 2$
sealed [2]-7:17, 7:18
search [5] - 63:3,
63:11, 63:21, 74:14, 75:7
searches [1] - 64:14
seasoned [1] - 74:25
second [2] - 31:20,
32:20
Section [1] - 77:6
see [15]-8:14, 24:17,
25:5, 27:17, 30:18,
49:1, 61:23, 62:9,
63:8, 65:18, 71:9,
73:24, 75:8, 75:9,
76:11
seek [4] - 5:19, 69:10,
69:12
seeking [1] - 53:18
sees [1] - 17:18
send [1]-57:13
sending [1] - 23:16
sense [11] - 13:1,
20:23, 21:19, 29:3,
72:20, 74:12, 74:17,
74:20, 74:24, 75:1,
75:11
sensitive [4]-6:21,
8:7, 8:12, 65:12
sent $[7]-12: 17,16: 16$,
16:17, 24:15, 31:11,
63:10, 74:16
sentence [4] - 15:10,
32:21, 43:20, 44:13
separate [3]-23:19,
37:9, 52:15
September [1] - 29:5
serve [1] - 27:11
services [1] - 16:4
set [8]-29:14, 50:13,
53:10, 66:18, 67:3,
67:16, 70:16, 75:10
sets [2]-52:15, 56:18
seven [1] - 7:15
several [1] - 19:12
shake [1] - 76:11
shaken [1] - 76:15
sheet [1] - 23:18
shell [1]-23:15
shocked [1] - 30:23
shortcut [1] - 62:14
shorthand [1] - 1:22
show [20] - 10:4, 10:6,

12:2, 12:4, 19:20,
23:1, 23:4, 32:6,
33:7, 33:10, 33:13,
$33: 15,34: 22,35: 10$,
40:7, 40:21, 62:12,
75:19
showing [1] - 12:10
shows [1] - 27:17
Shults [5] - 2:13, 2:14,
3:13, 6:17, 30:17
SHULTS [11] - 6:11,
6:14, 6:18, 6:20, 7:6,
7:8, 8:5, 9:4, 69:19,
70:1, 70:5
side [4] - 5:12, 24:11,
51:9, 73:3
side's [1] - 64:20
sided [1] - 50:8
sides [2] - 9:20, 55:13
sign [2] - 18:4, 60:7
signed [1] - 18:3
significance [1] -
72:10
signs [1] - 61:16
similar [5] - 8:23,
13:7, 13:10, 52:12, 52:18
similarly [3]-1:4, 3:3,
39:8
simple [2] - 9:22,
20:22
simply [1] - 39:18
single [1] - 43:13
sit [3]-22:1, 22:9,
30:16
sits [1]-61:21
sitting [3]-9:11,
30:13, 32:8
situated [2]-1:4, 3:3
situation [5] - 38:20,
$45: 13,45: 15,45: 16$,
45:17
situations [1] - 12:23
six [1] - 66:13
skilled [1] - 74:25
skip [2] - 35:13
slips [2]-41:5, 68:22
snap [1] - 57:5
sneak [1] - 14:22
so-called [1] - 39:19
soccer [3]-10:12,
40:11, 40:12
societies [1] - 11:2
solicitation [2] - 14:9,
18:16
solicitations [2] 13:18
solution [2] - 54:11,
56:9
someone [4]-18:18,


| ```67:16 trips [1] - 44:8 true [9]-28:14, 28:17, 34:3, 34:4, 39:4, 43:25, 44:14, 55:2, 77:7 truly [1] - 28:10 trust [2]-11:10, 75:3 trustee [2]-11:1, 39:7 trusts [1]-11:1 try [5] - 14:22, 20:7, 20:14, 60:20, 64:7 trying [10] - 9:21, 11:14, 11:19, 25:5, 25:22, 26:19, 29:22, 62:18, 74:4, 75:16 turmoil [1]-51:7 turn [1] - 43:11 TV [1] - 38:22 two [14]-8:16, 8:20, 9:20, 17:21, 31:1, 52:15, 52:17, 54:8, 60:22, 63:5, 65:20, 75:4 types [1]-71:3 typicality \([1]-62: 7\) typically \({ }_{[1]}\) - 21:3 \\ U \\ U.S [13] - 16:8, 25:2,None``` | $\begin{aligned} & \text { unravel }[1]-11: 15 \\ & \text { up }_{[29]}-9: 3,9: 12, \\ & 18: 3,18: 4,19: 4, \\ & 21: 3,23: 7,29: 14, \\ & 30: 12,36: 14,42: 25, \\ & 45: 2,46: 7,46: 8, \\ & 48: 5,48: 24,50: 18, \\ & 50: 19,51: 4,51: 18, \\ & 61: 21,63: 1,64: 11, \\ & 66: 3,68: 24,69: 6, \\ & 70: 6,74: 13,76: 1 \\ & \text { urgent }[1]-17: 18 \\ & \text { USA }[4]-37: 13,37: 17, \\ & 38: 1,58: 22 \end{aligned}$V <br> valid $_{[1]}-74: 23$ <br> value $[2]-16: 6,59: 7$ <br> various $[7]-4: 3,4: 22$, <br> $4: 25,32: 11,35: 12$, <br> $38: 3,53: 1$ <br> vast $[1]-14: 7$ <br> vehicle $[2]-18: 5$, <br> $25: 24$ <br> venture $[1]-27: 21$ <br> versus $[1]-3: 3$ <br> via $[2]-1: 22,4: 23$ <br> view $[4]-52: 14$, <br> $52: 15,71: 5,71: 10$ <br> Virginia $_{[1]}-27: 10$ <br> virtue $[1]-10: 24$ <br> visit $[2]-55: 19,59: 17$ <br> vS $_{[1]}-1: 6$ <br> W <br> wade [1]-65:2 <br> wait [1] - 29:4 <br> wants [2]-18:18, 37:6 <br> warrant ${ }_{[1]}$ - 50:12 <br> waste [1]-23:7 <br> ways [1]-45:1 <br> wbassett@ <br> bassettlawfirm. <br> com [1]-2:6 <br> wearing ${ }_{[1]}-61: 6$ <br> website [2]-12:20, <br> 13:6 <br> weeds [1]-64:11 <br> week [1] - 67:16 <br> weeks [2]-66:13, <br> 66:16 <br> wells [1] - 12:6 <br> Wells [1] - 64:1 <br> West $[1]-2: 14$ <br> Western [1]-77:5 <br> WESTERN ${ }_{[1]}$ - 1:1 <br> whole [8] - 11:11, $16: 5,40: 22,58: 25$ | ```71:10, 71:17, 74:16, 74:25 wholly [1] - 37:9 Wiedemann [1]-22:2 willing [2] - 15:19, 62:1 Wills [2]-26:10, 26:12 win [1]-24:23 wire [2]-23:19, 63:24 withdraw [1] - 75:10 witness [2]-61:22, 72:5 won [1] - 24:14 Woodward [2]-2:7, 3:11 WOODWARD [2] - 26:9, 27:23 Woody [2]-2:3, 3:10 word [2] - 31:9, 48:17 word's [1] - 16:18 wording [2] - 13:6, 31:3 words [3] - 29:11, 63:24, 76:13 world [1] - 3:25 worth [1] - 65:9 write [2] - 39:9, 65:23 writing [1] - 44:6 written [2] - 46:4, 64:5 wrote [3]-41:2, 41:3, 49:13 \begin{tabular}{c} \hline \(\mathbf{Y}\) \\ \hline y'all \([11]-52: 13\), \\ 59:16, \(70: 15,70: 17\), \\ \(71: 4,72: 19,72: 25\), \\ \(74: 24,75: 1,75: 3\), \\ \(76: 7\) \\ yachts \([1]-38: 12\) \\ year \([7]-25: 2,48: 22\), \\ 50:23, 54:19, 56:24, \\ 62:16, \(67: 7\) \\ year-end \([1]-56: 24\) \\ yearly \([1]-56: 24\) \\ years \([22]-17: 21\), \\ 19:8, 22:15, 25:2, \\ 29:23, 37:15, \(37: 16\), \\ \(47: 5,47: 1,47: 11\), \\ \(47: 12,47: 15,47: 20\), \\ 50:7,51:21, 55:8, \\ 58:19, \(60: 22,61: 1\), \\ \(72: 19,72: 23,72: 24\) \\ yesterday \([2]-63: 4\), \\ \(63: 10\) \\ Yohannan \([14]-\) \\ 10:18, 19:13, 19:19, \\ \(24: 2,26: 14,26: 22\), \\ \(36: 23,36: 25,37: 6\), \\ \(38: 14,57: 5,61: 9\), \end{tabular}``` | $\begin{aligned} & 71: 16,72: 5 \\ & \text { YOHANNAN }[1]-1: 8 \\ & \text { Yohannan's }[2]-11: 7, \\ & \text { 39:2 } \\ & \text { yourself }[1]-21: 23 \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

